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In the first chapter, I measure the impact of student loan debt on young, college-educated 
workers' decisions regarding labor supply and enrollment in graduate school. I exploit 
variation in student loan debt driven by the formulas that determine Federal Student Aid in 
order to identify these effects. Instrumental variable estimates indicate that in the initial years 
following graduation student loan debt seems to raise the likelihood of employment; the 
effect is most pronounced for female graduates. However, the evidence does not indicate 
that debt causes workers to opt into different types of occupations, as has been shown to be 
true among certain populations. Student loan debt also seems to lower the likelihood that an 
individual will obtain a graduate degree. These effects are too large to be consistent with the 
permanent income model, which predicts that graduates will effectively spread loan 
repayment over their lifetimes, causing only negligible changes in behavior during any single 
period. 
 
In the third chapter I examine lending mechanisms in the federal student loan program.  
Since the passage of the Higher Education Act in 1965, American students have been able to 
finance post-secondary education with federally subsidized loans. Until very recently 
students were able to access this credit through two channels; directly from the federal 
government or as a guaranteed loan from a private lender. The objective of this paper is to 
estimate the difference in loan default rates across the two lending programs. Since the 
! !
programs serve distinct groups of students quasi-experimental estimation techniques are 
used to estimate this difference. The estimates suggest that the moral hazard created by the 
loan guarantee leads private lenders to generate higher rates of student loan default than 
direct lending. 
 
In the final chapter, I estimate the temporal pattern of earnings losses faced by displaced 
workers eligible for the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program. Data from the 2001 Survey 
of Income and Program Participation and is used to perform an event study analysis. The 
resulting evidence indicates that displaced workers face decrease earnings in the months 
prior to displacement, a large drop in earnings during the month of displacement and losses 
that persist up to 6 months after displacement. Displaced workers eligible for Trade 
Adjustment Assistance face a similar pattern of earnings loss, but experience less loss during 
the period of displacement and greater losses during the period following displacement. 
Beyond the first month after displacement workers eligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance 
do not experience losses in excess of other displaced workers. I also find that workers 
Eligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance face higher rates of unemployment in the first 
three months following a displacement. By the fourth month the rate of unemployment is 
not different from other displaced workers. This evidence suggests that the additional 
benefits provided to unemployed workers under the Trade Adjustment Assistance program 
may not be warranted; these workers do not face persistent losses that exceed the losses 
experiences by other displaced workers. 
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Excess Sensitivity of Labor Supply
and Educational Attainment:
Evidence from Variation in Student
Loan Debt
1 Introduction
Between 1995 and 2007, the average cost of attendance at four-year post-
secondary institutions rose from $12,000 to $22,000, nearly doubling in just over
one decade. As a result, a growing number of families, no longer able to aﬀord
this expense with savings and present earnings alone, are relying on loans to
cover the costs of higher education. During the 1995-96 academic year, only
one quarter (25.9 percent) of students borrowed money to pay for college re-
lated expenses. By 2007-08, that fraction had increased to nearly 40 percent
(38.5) with two-thirds (65.6 percent) of bachelor’s degree graduates having ac-
cumulated some debt over the course of their college careers. In addition to
the growing incidence of debt among graduates, debt burdens have increased
as well. Among 2007-08 graduates, the average cumulative debt burden was
$24,700; up from $9,700 for 1992-93 graduates.
Despite the growing number of young people who carry large amounts of
debt at the outset of their careers, the impact of student loan debt on outcomes
following graduation is not well understood. Most of the existing literature on
this topic examines the impact that student loan availability has on college en-
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rollment and completion behavior [Dowd and Coury, 2006, St John and Noell,
1989, Kim, 2004]. Given that there are a variety of theories regarding attitudes
and behaviors toward debt, the eﬀects are not obvious. For instance, credit
constraints and psychological aversion to debt are often cited in education liter-
ature as hindrances to college enrollment [Keane, 2002, Field, 2009]. Therefore,
it is reasonable to question whether these models explain behavior after college
as well. Along those lines, one recent study provides evidence that debt has an
eﬀect on choice of occupation for a particular idiosyncratic population. Roth-
stein and Rouse [2007] show that student loan debt decreased the likelihood
that graduates from a highly selective US university would enter low-paying,
public service jobs.
This paper seeks to further the understanding of the eﬀects of student loan
debt on post-graduation behavior. I estimate the eﬀect of an individual’s stu-
dent loan debt burden on a variety of outcomes for young workers, including
employment, earnings, occupation choice and educational attainment. In order
to overcome the obvious problem of endogeneity, I exploit variation in student
loan debt driven by exogenous variation in Pell Grant awards and subsidized
Staﬀord Loan eligibility. Specifically, I make use of the concurrent enrollment
rule in the formulas used by the Department of Education to determine aid
generosity. This rule awards additional aid to households with multiple depen-
dents enrolled in post-secondary education. I will provide evidence to support
the notion that this variation is exogenous to the labor supply and educational
outcomes considered here and thus argue that estimates produced from instru-
mental variable regressions provide unbiased estimates of the eﬀects of student
loan debt. I use data from the 1993 Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal
Study, which surveyed a representative sample of students completing bache-
lor’s degrees during the 1992-93 academic year. Initial data for this study is
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gathered from federal financial aid forms and subsequent information regarding
employment, graduate school and other personal outcomes is collected through
a series of interviews spanning the decade following graduation.
My findings indicate that student loan debt does cause young workers to
make changes to their post-graduation behavior. In terms of labor supply, I
find that student loan debt causes an increase in the likelihood of employment
both conditional and not conditional on labor force participation. The sign of
the eﬀect is consistent across specifications, but is only statistically significant
for female borrowers. This indicates that debt increases both the desire to find
work and success at finding and maintaining a job. Much of the eﬀect can
be attributed to changes in graduate school enrollment. I find that student
loan debt seems to cause a reduction in the likelihood of enrollment in graduate
school during the decade following graduation. For those students who do enroll
in graduate school during this period, I find that debt does not cause them to
delay enrollment. This suggests that the decreased attainment during the first
decade is indicative of a reduction in lifetime attainment, and is not driven by
delayed enrollment. In addition, I find no evidence that student loan debt causes
workers to opt out of very low paying jobs.
The concurrent enrollment rule used to identify these eﬀects impacts only
those students with low enough household wealth to qualify for Federal Stu-
dent aid (roughly 60 percent of students in my sample). Also, since concurrent
enrollment is only possible for households with more than one dependent, the
identification strategy only considers variation in debt from multiple-dependent
households. Thus, the estimates represent the average eﬀect of debt on out-
comes for students from less wealthy households with multiple dependents. The
average response to debt within this population is likely diﬀerent from the mean
response across all groups. A lack of family wealth may mean that credit con-
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straints play a greater role in determining behaviors for these individuals. If
this is the case then the eﬀects of student loan debt identified here will be larger
than the average eﬀect across all groups. While the nature of the relationship
is not obvious, attitudes toward debt may also diﬀer systematically with family
wealth. Due to the potential relationship between family wealth and sensitivity
to debt, it is not reasonable to apply the estimates from this paper to a broader
population. However, this is not necessarily a weakness since curiosity about
the impact of debt is generally focused on less privileged individuals.
One reason it is important to understand the eﬀects of debt on young workers
is that changes in early labor market behavior could have persistent repercus-
sions. Recent literature finds evidence that shocks to earnings of young workers
persist beyond the expected duration. For instance, Von Wachter [2006] shows
that workers who face lay-oﬀ early in their career may have depressed earnings
for as many as 5 years. Furthermore, Oreopoulos et al. [2006] find evidence that
the earnings loss caused by entering the labor force during a recession can last
as many as eight to ten years, well beyond the period of the recession. Other re-
searchers have found similar results in diﬀerent settings [Kahn, 2010, Genda and
Kondo, 2010]. These findings indicate that early outcomes for young workers
are important determinants of income trajectory. Therefore, significant changes
in behavior in the initial years following graduation may have repercussions
throughout these workers’ lives. While I am only able to observe outcomes for
ten years following graduation, some inference can be made based on my find-
ings. For instance, the heightened propensity to work in relatively high paying
positions following graduation may cause an elevated earnings profile, similar
to the eﬀect of graduating during a period of economic expansion or not facing
a lay-oﬀ early in one’s career. Alternatively, the negative eﬀect of student loan
debt on educational attainment is likely to have a negative impact on income
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growth and thus lifetime earnings.
These findings provide evidence about the manner in which young workers
substitute wealth between periods. Since the magnitude of student loan debt
is small relative to lifetime earnings, any behavioral response should be slight
as long as graduates are spreading repayment over their lifetimes as predicted
by the permanent income model. While the typical student loan has a term
of 10 years (30 years for consolidation loans), individuals can eﬀectively repay
over a longer period by substituting with consumption loans (i.e. credit cards).
This point regarding the fungibility of financing was made in Gary S. Becker’s
seminal work on the topic of investment in human capital [1962]. The evidence
of increased labor supply and delayed consumption resulting from student loan
debt indicate that this population is spreading repayment over a much shorter
duration. This type of behavior is consistent with a model in which borrowers
face binding credit constraints (or prohibitively costly financing, equivalently)
or possess some psychological aversion to debt. Existing literature provides a
number of settings in which these alternatives provide a better description of
consumer behavior. For instance, a collection of studies finds that consumers
exhibit a very high propensity to consume from windfall payments [Hausman
and Poterba, 1987, Johnson et al., 2006, Blinder et al., 1985, Blinder, 1981, Card
et al., 2007] suggesting that consumption prior to the windfall was below the
desired level. However, literature specific to the setting of higher education finds
a conflicting result; credit constraints do not play a large role in determining
college enrollment [Keane, 2002, Nielsen et al., 2010]. It may also be the case
that these changes in behavior are being driven by some type of psychological
cost of carrying debt. A small collection of studies argue that an aversion
to debt plays a role in the college enrollment decision for less well-oﬀ students
[Burdman, 2005, Callender and Jackson, 2004, Field, 2009]. However, there isn’t
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any evidence to suggest that aversion to debt plays a role in repayment behavior
once the debt has been incurred - as is the case in this setting. The relatively
large eﬀects of debt identified here indicate that one of these alternative theories
may explain the behavior of these young college graduates. In this setting it is
not possible to determine to what extent each explains the observed behavior.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretic underpin-
nings of the empirical work. Section 3 outlines the identification strategy. Sec-
tion 4 describes the data used. Section 5 reports empirical findings and Section
6 concludes and provides a discussion of future work.
2 Permanent Income Model and Labor Supply
The permanent income model makes predictions regarding consumption be-
havior of individuals. Loosely, it tells us that transitory consumption should not
be very sensitive to wealth shocks that are small relative to lifetime earnings.
When individuals adjust current consumption in response to an income shock
by more than the extent to which the shock aﬀects their permanent income,
they are said to display excess sensitivity. A similar reasoning can be used to
consider the labor supply response to wealth shocks. Under the assumption of
complete credit markets, the wealth eﬀect of an income shock will be distributed
across labor supply in all periods. Therefore, small shocks to wealth should not
have large eﬀects on quantity of labor supplied in any single period. Instead, one
would expect current labor supply to adjust only to the extent that permanent
income is aﬀected by the shock. Rigidities in the labor market make it diﬃcult
for workers to make short term adjustments in hours worked, so it is more likely
that excess sensitivity would be apparent on the extensive margin. Eﬀects of
this nature were identified by Card et al. [2007]; they found that relatively large
severance payments (equal to two months salary) caused a significant decrease
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in the job finding rate. Since the quality of job match was not improved by the
resulting prolonged search, they attribute this eﬀect to decreased search inten-
sity. Student loan debt can be thought of as a negative shock to wealth and
thus the eﬀects on labor supply can be considered in a similar manner. This
model implies that the negative shock to permanent income caused by student
loan debt should increase willingness to supply labor, but large eﬀects are incon-
sistent with the permanent income model since the magnitude of debt is small
relative to lifetime earnings.
Using the simple model of labor supply from Rothstein and Rouse [2007],
one can extend the permanent income model to make further predictions about
the impact of debt on labor supply. Specifically, the model provides a framework
through which shocks to wealth, in the form of student loan debt, can aﬀect
occupation or job choice. In this model workers select jobs based on their prefer-
ences over earnings and non-pecuniary compensation, which includes things like
ease of work, hours required, job satisfaction, schedule flexibility, vacation time,
health benefits, etc. This illuminates the trade-oﬀ between income and these
non-pecuniary benefits faced by workers. In this model, the diﬀerence between
a workers’ potential earnings and realized earnings reveal the market value of
the non-pecuniary benefits, or amenities, associated with their job. This frame-
work creates a simple mechanism through which shocks to wealth can aﬀect the
nature of the job that an individual chooses.
As in Rothstein and Rouse [2007], each worker has potential earnings, ψ,
which is determined by individual characteristics. Realized earnings are then
determined by the diﬀerence between potential earnings and the market value
of amenities provided by a worker’s job, ψ − a. In this model, utility depends
on both consumption in the traditional sense and consumption of job amenities.
Lifetime utility is equal to the discounted sum of period utilities.







Lifetime utility is constrained by an inter-temporal budget constraint that ac-
counts for the tradeoﬀ between pecuniary earnings and job amenities. The level
of initial wealth is denoted by w0. In the setting of my study, w0 refers to wealth























In the canonical model, an agent who behaves in accordance with the permanent
income hypothesis seeks to equalize consumption across all periods. This results
relies on the assumption of a quadratic utility (Equation 4) and equality of the
interest rate on saving with the inverse of the discount rate: β(1+r) = 1 (where
Ct = ct + at ).




For simplicity of the discussion, I will maintain these assumptions. The
Euler equation associated with this utility function provides the principal result
from the permanent income model; desired consumption is equal in all periods.
b1 − b2Ct
b1 − b2Ct+1 = 1 (5)
This implies C∗t = C∗t+1 = C∗. Combining this condition with the inter-
3 IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 9
temporal budget constraint indicates that consumption in any period is equal












In the context of the labor supply framework proposed by Rothstein and
Rouse [2007], Ct represents a composite good consisting of both goods and ser-
vices, and job amenities. Therefore, the previous result implies that shocks to
permanent income can be absorbed through adjustment of both consumption
of goods and services and job amenities. For instance, an increase in student
loan debt, equivalent to a negative shock to wealth, would induce a reduction
in consumption of goods and services, but also an increase in earnings due to
a lower demand for job amenities. The consumer diﬀuses the shock further by
spreading its eﬀects across all periods of life. These two aspects of the model
indicate that shocks that are small relative to lifetime earnings will not induce
large changes in labor supply behavior. Observing behavior inconsistent with
these predictions suggests that these young workers are either unable or unwill-
ing to borrow from future wealth in order to smooth utility. In the empirical
section below, I will investigate the manner in which individuals adjust earnings
in response to shocks to initial wealth, w0, caused by student loan debt.
3 Identification Strategy
An individual’s reliance on student loans to finance post-secondary education
is determined in large part by factors that also aﬀect early labor supply outcomes
and educational attainment. This is the primary challenge in estimating the
eﬀect of student loan debt on these outcomes. In order to generate an unbiased
estimate, the variation in debt used to identify the eﬀect must be exogenous
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to subsequent labor market outcomes and the decision to enroll in graduate
school. In order to overcome this challenge I exploit a feature of the formulas
used by the US Department of Education to determine student aid generosity
which causes award amounts to diﬀer among students who are similar on most
dimensions. The variation in student aid appropriation causes these similar
students to take on diﬀering amounts of student loan debt in order to pay for
college. This creates a quasi-experimental setting in which I can estimate the
eﬀect of debt on outcomes for young workers.
The two primary aid mechanisms used by the federal government are Pell
grants and subsidized Staﬀord loans. Pell grants are annual awards made to
students that do not need to be repaid. The amount of the award varies ac-
cording to a household’s demonstrated financial need and in practice are pri-
marily awarded to relatively low income households. The maximum award was
$2,400 during the 1992-93 academic year, small relative to the average cost of
attendance. Subsidized Staﬀord loans are designed to bring the gap between
a families ability to pay and the cost of college attendance. Students borrow
Staﬀord loan directly from the government at an interest rate that is well below
the private market rate. In 2011, private student loan rates charged interest
rates as high as 14 percent while the interest rate on subsidized Staﬀord loans
was fixed at 4.5 percent. In addition to the interest rate benefit, the interest
on subsidized loans does not begin accruing until the student graduates from
college. Interest accrual is postponed further if the student enrolls in graduate
study. The availability of subsidized loans is also determined by a household’s
ability to pay, but this program reaches a broader segment of the population.
During the 2009-10 academic year, 32 percent of full time students received a
Pell grant; 45 percent borrowed a Staﬀord loan. Like the Pell grant program,
generosity of this benefit decreases with household wealth.
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For each of these means tested programs a student’s ability to pay for college
out out savings and current income, called the expected family contribution, is
based on an index of household wealth. This index is calculated at the beginning
of each academic year to determine the the annual Pell grant award and subsi-
dized Staﬀord loan eligibility. A complex formula designed to capture all aspects
of a household’s financial position is used to calculate expected family contribu-
tion. The formula takes into account earned income, government benefits, child
support and alimony, educational expenses for students enrolled in primary and
secondary school, taxes, home wealth, business wealth and the value of other
assets. The important feature of this formula for the sake of my study is the
adjustment for the number of family members enrolled in post-secondary edu-
cation. The last step in the calculation of expected family contribution, after all
income and assets have been combined to create an index of wealth, is division
by the number of people in the household enrolled in post-secondary educa-
tion. (Equations 7 and 8 illustrate the exact mechanical relationship between
program generosity and expected family contribution.) This creates variation
in program generosity across similar families. Both the Pell grant award and
eligibility for subsidized Staﬀord loans increases with additional household en-
rollment. A result of this policy is that there is variation in student loan debt
at the time of entry into the labor force for otherwise similar students. To the
extent that the variation in enrollment across like families is exogenous to the
labor supply and educational outcomes, this variation can be used to estimate
the eﬀects of student loan debt.
SubsidizedLoanEligibility = (7)
CostOfAttendance− ExpectedFamilyContribution−OtherAid
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PellGrant = min($2400, CostOfAttendance− ExpectedFamilyContribution)
(8)
Ideally I would exploit the variation in student aid driven only by variation
in sibling age distributions since it is highly plausible that this variation is
exogenous to outcomes. However, I am not able to observe the ages of siblings
in this study. Instead, I rely on a variable which captures the number of siblings
who were enrolled in college during an individual’s last year of undergraduate
study1. Thus, I cannot isolate the variation in student aid benefits that is due
to sibling age diﬀerences alone. This variable captures both the eﬀect of sibling
age diﬀerences and the eﬀect of sibling non-enrollment. For instance, consider
a student from a household with two dependents and suppose that the survey
report no sibling enrollment. There are two potential reasons for this. First, the
other dependent may not be an appropriate age to attend college (either not
finished with secondary education, or already having already completed college).
Alternatively, the other dependent may have chosen not to attend college. In
order to use the variation in debt driven by this variable, it must be that in
either instance the observed student’s outcomes serve as a valid counterfactual
for a student from a two-dependent household who received additional aid due to
overlapping enrollment. If there is a family eﬀect, not captured by a small set of
family control variables, that determines both concurrent enrollment (through
either preferences over timing of children or propensity of children to attend
college) and later outcomes, then the variation driven by this rule cannot be
used to identify the eﬀects of student loan debt. I will provide evidence in the
next section which indicates that this is a valid assumption.
1The unit of observation for this study is the household. While I refer to other dependents
as siblings, this variables captures the enrollment of all dependents, regardless of relation.
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The following equations illustrate the empirical model that exploits the vari-
ation in debt driven by the concurrent enrollment rule. In the first stage regres-
sion student loan debt (cumulative from undergraduate study) is regressed on
the number of household member enrolled during the individual’s last year of
study as well as controls for individual and family characteristics (Equation 9).
In the second stage, outcomes are regressed on the predicted values from the
first stage (Equation 10) in order to estimate the eﬀect of student loan debt.
Xi includes a variable that measures the number of siblings in individual i’s
household. This is necessary in order to isolate the variation in debt driven
by concurrent enrollment within similar families rather than variation due to
family size. The eﬀect of student loan debt on the outcome is estimated by the
coeﬃcient θ1.
StudentLoanDebti = β0 + β1ConcurrentEnrollment+ β2Xi + εi (9)
LaborMarketOutcomei = θ0 + θ1 ˆStudentLoanDebti + θ2Xi + εi (10)
In order for this specification to properly isolate the variation in debt driven
by concurrent enrollment, it must be the case that concurrent enrollment is not
highly correlated with any of the other explanatory variables. The relationship
between concurrent enrollment and family size raises some concern about this
type of multicoliearity. A second specification for the first stage of this model
provides a more explicit method for isolating variation in concurrent enrollment
within households with the same number of dependents. In this specification,
the measure of concurrent enrollment is interacted with dummy variables in-
dicating the number of dependents in a household (Dij is equal to 1 when
individual i’s household has j dependents). By estimating a separate concurrent
enrollment coeﬃcient, λj , for each household size, this specification completely
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isolates variation in debt driven by concurrent enrollment.
StudentLoanDebti = β0 +
￿
j=1
λj (Dij × ConcurrentEnrollment) + β1Xi + εi
(11)
These specifications can be used to measure the eﬀect of student loan debt on
a variety of outcomes. Motivated by the model presented above, I will consider
annual earnings, employment, occupation choice and educational attainment.
The magnitude of the variation in student loan debt driven by student aid is
very small relative to lifetime wealth. Since this identification strategy captures
the eﬀect of concurrent enrollment only in a single year of study, the varia-
tion is limited even further (I will discuss the magnitude in the next section).
Therefore, any large behavioral response to the isolated exogenous variation in
debt indicates that young workers absorb the negative wealth shock over a brief
horizon rather than spreading the eﬀect over the course of their lifetimes.
Unbiased estimates rely on the assumption that the variation induced by
the concurrent enrollment rule provides exogenous variation in initial wealth
levels. In addition to the concern raised earlier about unobserved family eﬀects
driving both concurrent enrollment and later outcomes, there are a few plausible
reasons to believe that the variation in student loan debt driven by concurrent
enrollment may not be exogenous to the labor supply and education outcomes. I
will identify these sources for concern and provide empirical evidence regarding
their relevance in section 5.
4 Data
The following empirical work is performed using data from the Baccalaureate
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and Beyond Longitudinal Study2. The study examines the work and personal
experiences of a representative sample of individuals receiving bachelor degrees
in the United States during the 1992-93 academic year. The initial sample was
drawn from the National Post-Secondary Aid Study (NPSAS), which collects in-
formation about students from multiple sources including institutional records,
government databases and student interviews. This provides extensive informa-
tion on participation in student financial aid programs, family circumstances,
demographics, education and work experiences, and student expectations that
would otherwise be unavailable. Follow-up interviews with participants take
place at four points during the first decade following graduation: 1993, 1994,
1997 and finally in 2003. This data has been used most frequently in the field
of education, but the survey content allows for labor supply analysis as well.
Summary statistics for the population in this study are provided in Table
1. The first two columns report means for the two relevant sub-populations:
those who received some federal student aid and those who did not. There are a
few systematic diﬀerences between these sub-populations. Those who received
some aid earn less income, on average, in both the first year out of college
and ten years later. This population also has lower levels of post-baccalaureate
education across each type of degree. The most pronounced diﬀerence between
these two populations is the unadjusted expected family contribution3. Aid
recipients come from significantly less well-oﬀ households, reflecting the means-
tested nature of the program. Other literature has shown that less well-oﬀ
students are more sensitive to debt, suggesting that the sensitivities estimated
in this study do not serve as good estimates for the population. The lack of
family wealth as a backstop may cause less well-oﬀ workers to be more aﬀected
2This data is made available under a limited-use license from the U.S. Department of
Education.
3The unadjusted expected family contribution is calculated using the expected family con-
tribution formula as if the household had only one dependent enrolled in post-secondary
education. This creates a measure of wealth that does not vary due to concurrent enrollment.
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by credit constraints and have diﬀerent attitudes about carrying debt.
The third and fourth columns of this table compare the population exam-
ined in this study against a representative sample from the Current Population
Survey (CPS). The sample drawn from the Current Population Survey is lim-
ited to the population of individuals who were age 25 in 1993 - corresponding
to the mean age at graduation for individuals in the Baccalaureate and Beyond
Study. To begin with, the populations diﬀer immensely by educational attain-
ment. While the Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study is limited to
bachelor’s degree recipients, the Current Population Survey reports that less
than one third of similarly aged individuals in the population receive a bach-
elor’s degree. Consistent with this observation, the Baccalaureate and Beyond
Longitudinal Study population earns significantly higher earnings in the year of
their graduation with the gap widening further the end of the study in 2003.
The systematic diﬀerences between the population in the Baccalaureate and
Beyond Study and the general population in the country make it unreasonable
to drawn inference abut the general population from the results of this study.
5 Results
5.1 Concurrent Enrollment and Student Loan Debt
Recall that the concurrent enrollment rule aﬀects student loan debt, and
thus initial wealth, through two channels: Pell grants and subsidized Staﬀord
loans. Figure 1 illustrates the eﬀect of a Pell grant on borrowing in a simple two-
period model. Since the small shock to wealth is distributed across consumption
in all periods, any increase in consumption is necessarily smaller than the value
of the grant. This implies that the magnitude of debt carried from the the first
to the second period decreases. Figure 2 illustrates the eﬀect of an increase in
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subsidized loan eligibility on borrowing and consumption behavior. The kinked
budget set reflects the variety of borrowing costs faced by a student borrower.
The flatter segment illustrates the tradeoﬀ faced when the student is borrowing
subsidized Staﬀord loans. The cost of borrowing increases when the student’s
borrowing exceeds their personal limit for subsidized loans. Increasing eligibility
for subsidized loans, illustrated by lengthening the flattest segment, increases
the desired level of period 1 consumption, and debt for most students. Those
who were initially borrowing within their limit for subsidized loans would not
alter their behavior. Since concurrent enrollment creates opposing eﬀects on
debt through these two mechanisms, the net eﬀect of concurrent enrollment on
debt depends on the magnitudes of the eﬀects.
Figure 1: The Eﬀect of a Pell Grant: Consumption increase by less
than initial wealth, decreasing period 1 debt.
c1 
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Figure 2: The Eﬀect of Additional Subsidized Loan Eligibility: New
budget constraint illustrated by dotted line. No change in consump-
tion if initial demand at point A. Increase in consumption and debt
if initial demand at point B or C.
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While theory does not predict the sign of the correlation between concurrent
enrollment and student loan debt, it can be observed empirically. In a regression
of student loan debt on the number of siblings within the household enrolled in
post-secondary education, ordinary least squares estimates suggest that addi-
tional household enrollment raises student loan debt. Point estimates vary, but
the preferred specification suggests that raising enrollment within the household
by one student would raise student loan debt by approximately $1700 (Table
3, column 4). Control variables for the cost and quality of education, family
wealth4, student aptitude and number of dependents within the household are
4Unadjusted Expected Family Contribution serves as the measure of family wealth in these
regressions.
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used to isolate the eﬀect of concurrent enrollment. Since concurrent enrollment
is closely related to the number of dependents in a household, it is important to
control for household composition precisely in order to isolate the variation in
concurrent enrollment. Estimates of this eﬀect using household size indicators
interacted with household enrollment also indicate that concurrent enrollment
has a positive eﬀect on student loan debt. Table 4 reports the coeﬃcients for
interactions between the measured concurrent enrollment and dummy variables
for the number of dependents within a household. For the sake of later infer-
ence, it is important to note that the variation in student loan debt is driven
mainly by households with two or three dependents enrolled.
The previous estimates indicate that concurrent enrollment has a significant
eﬀect on student loan debt. However, the magnitude of this variation is small
relative to lifetime earnings. Estimates from the Census Bureau indicate that
depending on eventual educational attainment this cohort of graduates could
expect to earn upwards of 1.4 million dollars over the course of their lifetimes.
The average debt burden for these graduates is slightly less than $10,000. This
amounts to less than one percent of lifetime earnings. The variation in debt
due to concurrent enrollment amounts to significantly less. Therefore, the vari-
ation in debt used to estimate the impact of variation in initial wealth on labor
outcomes would generate nearly imperceptible eﬀects if behavior was consistent
with the permanent income hypothesis.
5.2 Concurrent Enrollment Exogenous to Outcomes
In the identification strategy outline above, the ability to generate unbiased
estimates relies on the assumption that concurrent enrollment aﬀects labor mar-
ket and education outcomes - if at all - through its eﬀect on student loan debt.
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In this section I will identify a few mechanisms through which concurrent en-
rollment could conceivably aﬀect labor market outcomes. The viability of each
will be tested using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
(NLSY79).
Since the Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study does not collect
information about the ages and enrollment behavior of siblings I must rely on
another source of data, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1979), for
this exercise. The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth is a nationally repre-
sentative sample of individuals born between 1957 and 1964. These individuals
are slightly older than participants in the Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitu-
dinal Study whose average age in 1993 was 25 compared to 33 in the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Regardless, they should provide a suﬃciently
comparable group for these analyses. In the following regressions I limit the
sample to college graduates since I am only concerned about the relevance of
these potential sources of endogeneity in this population.
Concurrent enrollment will vary across families with the same number of
dependents when the age distributions diﬀer. For instance, consider a set of
siblings that are two years apart. If both students enroll in college immediately
upon graduation from high school, their college careers would overlap for two
years. If they were only one year apart in age, they would overlap for three years.
It is conceivable that age diﬀerence between siblings is related to other factors
that ultimately aﬀect labor market outcomes. For instance, mother’s labor force
participation may be related to the distribution of her children’s ages. Alterna-
tively, unobserved household characteristics that aﬀect labor market outcomes
may be related to preferences for timing of births. Using the National Longi-
tudinal Survey of Youth, I estimate the eﬀect of sibling age spread on annual
earnings using an ordinary least squares regression. In order to avoid capturing
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the eﬀect operating through the concurrent enrollment rule I limit the sample
to a population that was unlikely to be eligible for federal student aid. Since
I cannot observe the precise measures used to determine eligibility, I limit the
sample to those individuals whose household’s were in the top half of the earn-
ings distribution when they were a child in 1979. The results of this regression
are reported in column 1 of Table 5. The point estimate indicates that being an
additional month older than your next younger sibling would lower your earn-
ings by approximately $425. However, this coeﬃcient is estimated with very
large standard errors indicating that variation in age spread is not highly cor-
related with earnings. This suggests that variation in debt driven by variation
in age distribution across families is exogenous and can be used to estimate the
eﬀects of student loan debt.
The previous test implicitly assumed that timing of college enrollment is de-
termined entirely by age. However, that is not necessarily the case. Households
have an incentive adjust enrollment timing in order to maximize the duration
of concurrent enrollment in order to collectively maximize federal aid. Presum-
ably, there is some cost to delaying enrollment but it is not clear whether the
magnitude of this cost exceeds the benefits of strategic enrollment timing. If
strategic enrollment behavior is displayed by a non-random selection of house-
holds, then the variation in concurrent enrollment could fail to be exogenous
to labor market outcomes. In order to test for this type of strategic behavior,
I estimate the eﬀect of the diﬀerence in age between each individual and their
next younger sibling on the age at enrollment in college. If individuals with
a younger sibling close in age delay enrollment in order to take advantage of
this benefits then one would expect a positive correlation between age of en-
rollment on the inverse of the age diﬀerence with the next younger sibling. In
addition, one might expect a positive correlation between having a younger sib-
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ling, conditional on having siblings, and age of enrollment. These relationships
are estimated with ordinary least squares regressions; results are reported in
table 6. The point estimate for the coeﬃcient on the inverse of months older
than the next younger sibling is very small with large standard errors. Despite
the positive sign, the magnitude is not consistent strategic enrollment timing.
According to these estimates, having a younger sibling is negatively correlated
with age of enrollment. Both of these results suggest that strategic enrollment
behavior is not a source of concern for the identification strategy.
As I discussed earlier, another reason for concurrent enrollment to vary
across families with the same number of dependents is non-enrolling siblings.
To the extent that sibling educational attainment is correlated with labor mar-
ket outcomes (perhaps both driven by an unobservable family characteristic)
the variation in concurrent enrollment does not provide the exogenous variation
in student loan debt needed to identify the eﬀect on labor market outcomes.
Regression estimates suggest a positive but insignificant relationship between
younger sibling college enrollment and annual earnings in the year of graduation
(Table 5, column 2). While the large positive coeﬃcient is concerning, it is not
clear that this result invalidates the identification strategy since the coeﬃcient
is estimated with large standard errors. One fact that mitigates concern about
an unobserved family eﬀect is the relatively low incidence of younger sibling
non-enrollment. Among college graduates from the NLSY, nearly three quarter
(72.5 percent) of next-younger siblings enrolled in college This indicates that
sibling non-enrollment may determine only a limited portion of the variation of
concurrent enrollment observed in the Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal
Study.
The “upgrade eﬀect” provides one additional source of potential endogeneity.
The more generous aid package caused by concurrent enrollment might cause
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students to select schools with a higher cost of attendance. Presumable this re-
flects a higher quality education which could aﬀect later outcomes. If students
behave in this manner then concurrent enrollment may aﬀect labor market out-
comes through this channel. Estimates of the eﬀect of concurrent enrollment on
tuition, a proxy for school quality, suggest that student behavior is consistent
with an upgrade eﬀect. The point estimate of a regression of tuition on concur-
rent enrollment and controls reveals a significant positive relationship (Table 7).
This would be problematic for the instrumental variables identification strategy
if adequate controls for education quality were not available. In order to control
for this eﬀect I use two diﬀerent measures of education costs in the two-stage
least squares specifications; grant adjusted cost of attendance and list price tu-
ition. The grant-adjusted cost of attendance is the student specific price net of
any price discriminatory institution grants. Tuition captures the market price
of the education and serves as a proxy for education quality.
This collective evidence suggests that the variation in student loan debt
driven by the concurrent enrollment rule is exogenous to other important deter-
minants of labor market outcomes. Unbiased estimates of the eﬀects of student
loan debt on various labor supply and educational outcomes can be obtained by
using an instrumental variables approach to isolate this variation.
5.3 The Eﬀects of Student Loan Debt
The model of labor supply discussed earlier showed how student loan debt
could aﬀect the nature of a worker’s job choice. Specifically, debt may cause
workers to choose jobs with higher earnings and lower amenities if they are
unable or unwilling to borrow from future wealth. In order to measure the
extent to which student loan debt causes this behavior I estimate the eﬀect of
debt on annual earnings using the two-stage least squares identification strategy
outline in the previous section. I estimate the eﬀect separately for each of the
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initial five years following graduation. The results are provided in Table 8.
Coeﬃcient estimates from the full specification, with concurrent enrollment
interacted with household size dummies as the instrument, indicate that debt
has a relatively large negative eﬀect on earnings in the year of graduation, 1993,
indicating that an additional dollar of debt would lower earnings in that year
by nearly two dollars (-1.97). This is not consistent with the notion of workers
selecting higher paying jobs as a result of debt, however, this result uncovers
a diﬀerent insight about labor supply behavior. It may be the case that the
lower earnings observed in the first year reflect a lower reservation wage. This
would cause some workers to have low paying jobs that might otherwise have
remained unemployed. After 1993, the eﬀect of debt on earnings is positive,
but estimated with large standard errors. The estimated coeﬃcient in 1994
suggests that an additional dollar of debt raises earnings in that year by 34
cents. The sign and magnitude estimated here are consistent with a model in
which debt causing these workers to select higher paying jobs that oﬀer lower
levels of amenities. Estimates for later years are negative and of a similar
magnitude; not consistent with this type of eﬀect. The signs of the coeﬃcient
estimates in this set of regression do not reveal an entirely cohesive explanation
of behavior. However, the non-negligible estimates suggest that debt does have
an eﬀect on labor supply behavior on some dimension. The estimated eﬀects
may be capturing a change is work force composition in addition to any strict
earnings eﬀects.
Debt may also aﬀect labor supply on the extensive margin. This can take
place through a variety of channels including search eﬀort, reservation wage and
propensity to attend graduate school. In order to estimate the eﬀect of student
loan debt on this margin of labor supply, I regress an indicator for employment
on student loan debt using the instrumental variables strategy outlined above
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in a linear probability model. Employment is measured in April of the sur-
vey year except in 1993 where it is measured in November in order to capture
post-graduation (rather than in-school) employment. The estimated eﬀect of
$1,000 in student loan debt is reported in table 9. The first row reports esti-
mates from the preferred specification, a linear probability model using the form
of the instrument that interacts household enrollment with number of depen-
dents. While the estimates are not statistically significant, they seem to reveal
a positive relationship between debt and employment that diminishes over time.
The point estimates indicate than an additional $1000 in debt would raise the
likelihood of employment by 3.4 percent in the first year following graduation.
The eﬀect diminishes to 1 percent by the second year. IV probit estimates of
the same regression, provided in the second row of table 9, suggest a similar
pattern. For this population, the rate of employment increases from 83 percent
in 1993 to 89 percent in 1997. The estimates from the primary specification at
illustrated in figure 3. I repeat the estimation twice more by limiting the sample
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Figure 3: The Effect of  $1,000 Student Loan Debt on 
the Probability of  Employment 
 
(+/- two standard errors) 
The point estimates from these alternative specifications have the same sign,
but smaller magnitude. They also suggest an initial positive eﬀect that dimin-
ishes over time, but the point estimates are not statistically significant. The
estimates for non-students are illustrated in figure 4. These estimates indicate
that student loan debt aﬀects labor force participation through graduate school
enrollment and other unidentified channels. In addition, debt raises the likeli-
hood of employment conditional on labor force participation. These estimates
illustrate that the young workers in this study make labor supply decisions that
are inconsistent with predictions of a permanent income model; small shocks to
wealth in the form of student loan debt cause significant changes in labor supply
behavior in the initial years following graduation. Rothstein and Rouse (2007)
do not find a statistically significant eﬀect of debt on employment rates for the
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Figure 4: The Effect of  $1,000 Student Loan Debt on 
the Probability of  Employment (non-students) 
 
(+/- two standard errors) 
In addition to providing context for the previous result, understanding the
eﬀect of debt on graduate school enrollment is independently noteworthy. In
order to estimate this eﬀect I regress an indicator for graduate school enroll-
ment on student loan debt using an instrumental variables probit model and
repeat this separately for each year. The estimated eﬀect of $1,000 in student
loan debt on graduate school enrollment in a given year are illustrated in Fig-
ure 5 (estimates in table 9). These estimates indicate that student loan debt
seems to have a negative eﬀect on the likelihood of attending graduate school in
the first five years following graduation. The point estimates are negative, but
not statistically significant during this period. In order to determine whether
decreased attendance in these years is due to delayed enrollment rather than
non-enrollment I estimate the eﬀect of debt on age of graduate degree comple-
tion for those in the sample who do attend graduate school during the decade
following graduation (1993-2003). Estimates from the instrumental variable re-
gression indicate that debt does not cause a delay in graduate school completion
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for those who do attend during this period. The point estimate is positive, but
not statistically significant (estimates reported in table 12). This suggests that
the decreased attainment in the decade following graduation is not explained
by delayed enrollment but rather decreased lifetime attainment. Next, I seek
to identify the type of graduate students that are most sensitive to debt. Table
13 reports the estimated eﬀect of debt on completion of a masters degree, a
PhD or professional degree. The estimates are not statistically significant, but
the signs indicate that debt causes masters and PhD students delay enrollment
while students seeking professional degrees complete their degrees earlier as a
result of debt. This analysis ignores any eﬀects of debt on choice of degree.
These are surprising and somewhat ironic results. Since student loans are
one of the primary tools used by the federal government to heighten educational
attainment, it is unexpected to observe that debt may decrease educational
attainment. The fact that federal student aid programs provide financing to
graduates students as they do undergraduates and suspend interest accrual on
undergraduate loans while enrolled in graduate school make this results even
more surprising since it is unlikely that additional debt carried from under-
graduate study is creating binding credit constraints. However, this does not
imply that the federal student loan program doesn’t raise average attainment
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Figure 5: The Effect of  $1,000 Student Loan Debt on 
the Probability of  Being Enrolled in Graduate School 
 
(+/- two standard errors) 
In order to further test the hypothesis that student loan debt causes workers
to select higher paying jobs, I estimate the eﬀect of debt on the propensity
to enter extremely low or high paying jobs using the same specification. High
earnings is defined as earnings above the 75th percentile of earnings all employed
workers in the sample in a given year, while workers with earnings below the
25th percentile are classified as low-earners. Employed students, who likely
have very low earnings, are omitted from this analysis. The point estimates,
which are not statistically significant, do not indicate that debt would aﬀect the
likelihood of being a low or high earner in the five years following graduation.
These results are reported in table 10 and illustrated in figures 6 and 7. This
result is not consistent with the findings ofRothstein and Rouse [2007]. They
find that debt causes graduates from a very highly selective university to be less
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Figure 6: The Effect of  $1,000 Student Loan Debt on 
the Probability of  Low Earnings 
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Figure 7: The Effect of  $1,000 Student Loan Debt on 
the Probability of  High Earnings 
 
(+/- two standard errors) 
I provide additional evidence on occupation choice by estimating the eﬀect
of debt on entry into one specific high-amenity position, teaching. While job
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amenities are not directly observable, it is reasonable to think that teaching
represents a prime example of an occupation with a high level of amenities. The
2006 General Social Survey reports that teaching ranks 6th in job satisfaction, 69
percent of teachers reporting that they are very satisfied with their job compared
to 33 percent in all other occupations. This fact combined with the relatively
low salaries make teaching a good example of a high amenity occupation for
the purpose of this test. I estimate the eﬀects of debt on the likelihood of
working as a teacher during 1994 and 1997. The estimated coeﬃcients indicate
that debt lowers the probability of working as a teacher in both years (Table
11). However, the eﬀects are estimated with very large standard errors. Point
estimates indicate that $1000 in student debt would lower the likelihood of
working as a teacher in the first year after college by 1.7 percentage points. This
eﬀect is much large than the one estimated by Rothstein and Rouse (2007). They
find that $10,000 in student debt lowers like likelihood of entering the teaching
profession by 3.3 percentage points. This diﬀerence suggests that students from
the highly selective university considered in their study are much less sensitive
to debt. Regardless of the true model of behavior, credit constraints or debt
aversion, this is not inconsistent with the fact that students in the representative
sample of graduates have less family wealth.
6 Heterogenous Eﬀects
Its reasonable to expect that the eﬀect of debt will vary across types of
students. One of the most obvious dimensions to consider is family wealth.
Under both theories of debt aversion and credit constraints, we would expect
wealthy students to have a diﬀerent response to debt than less well-oﬀ students.
If the true model of behavior involves credit constraints then we would expect the
eﬀect of debt to be muted for borrowers from wealthy families, who presumably
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have the ability to borrow from their parents. The diﬀerence between the eﬀects
for these two groups is less apparent if debt aversion is a significant driver of
behavior. It is unclear whether less well-oﬀ students would be more or less averse
to debt than wealthy students. However, it seems reasonable to believe that their
attitudes toward debt would diﬀer in some manner. Table 13 reports estimates
of the eﬀect of debt on both employment and graduate school enrollment for
students from high and low wealth families. The estimates are generated in
the same manner as those in the previous section, using the same identification
strategy, but are estimated separately for each population. Students are assigned
to wealth categories based on the expected family contribution, as defined by
the Federal Application for Student Aid. Like in the previous section, I have
recalculated this value to eliminate the adjustment for concurrent enrollment.
the threshold value for high wealth households is set at the 75th percentile.
The estimates do not indicate that the response to debt diﬀers by wealth. This
conclusion is robust to a variety of threshold definitions.
Another dimension on which the eﬀect is likely to vary is gender. Historically
women have less attachment to the work force and are therefore more likely to
demonstrate measurable changes in labor force behavior in response to debt.
Estimates of the impact of debt by gender are provided in table 14. It is apparent
from these estimates that the positive eﬀect of debt on employment is being
driven primarily by female graduates. The statistically significant estimates
indicate that an additional $1000 in debt will raise the likelihood that a women
is employed in the year following graduation by 3.5 percentage points. The
eﬀect diminishes slightly in the second year and then becomes indistinguishable
from zero thereafter. The estimates for male graduates are not distinguishable
from zero in any period. The rate of employment for females graduates is only
slightly higher than the rate of employment for males graduates in the first year
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following graduation; 84 and 82 percent recpectively.
7 Conclusion
The evidence presented here indicates that student loan debt aﬀects the
labor supply decisions of young workers, especially women. Namely, I find
that debt raises the likelihood of employment for women in the first few years
following graduation. However, I do not find evidence that debt aﬀects labor
supply decisions on the intensive margin. Debt does not have a significant
impact on the likelihood of entering either low or high wage occupations. The
increased supply of labor that results from student loan debt is inconsistent
with a permanent income model which would predict only negligible changes in
behavior. Instead, the observed eﬀects are consistent with a refusal or inability
to borrow from future wealth. The observed eﬀects are more consistent with
models that take into account borrowing constraints or a psychological aversion
to debt. Determining the extent to which these competing theories explain the
observed behavior is a topic for future work.
In addition to the eﬀect on employment and occupation choice, I have pro-
vided evidence to indicate that student loan debt lowers the likelihood of gradu-
ate degree attainment. This is an interesting result because the primary objec-
tive of the federal student loan program is to heighten educational attainment
by alleviating borrowing constraints in the private market. This does not indi-
cate that the policy does not accomplish its intended purpose, but rather that
the availability of student debt might decrease graduate degree attainment for a
certain subset of the population. It is likely the case that the availability of debt
increases the likelihood of degree attainment when a broader sub-population is
considered. Regardless, this surprising result warrants further consideration in
a welfare analysis framework.
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Further work on this topic should take into account a more comprehensive
understanding of the household balance sheet. In this analysis I was constrained
to consider only student loan debt as a determinant of worker behavior. The
eﬀect of student loan debt on labor supply decision making likely depends largely
on the nature of one’s financial position. Examining this question further in a
setting where additional financial information is available may help to determine
whether credit constraints or an aversion to debt are responsible for the excess





Bachelors Degree 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.306
Graduate Degree 0.162 0.164 0.163 0.101
PhD 0.013 0.016 0.014 0.01
Professional Degree 0.024 0.029 0.026 0.018
Grade Point Average 3.195 3.195 3.195 .
Income
Annual Income 1993 $14,668 $18,321 $16,179 $13,247
Annual Income 2003 $52,673 $56,034 $54,113 $32,800
Demographic
Male 0.426 0.439 0.432 0.499
White 0.871 0.911 0.888 0.829
Financial
Parents' Income 26,715 54,974 28,153 .
Tuition 4,967 4,448 4,745 .
Dependent Student 0.524 0.696 0.598 .
Unadjusted Cost of  Attendance $11,763 $11,006 $11,432 .
$5,450 $16,440 $9,477 .
Pell grant award* $1,519 na na .
Cumulative Undergraduate Debt* $9,682 na na .
N 6400 4790 11190 2110
Table 1
*Aid designation based on receipt in final year of  study.  Means for Pell grant award 
calculated for population with positive awards, excluding some aid recipients who were 
eligible for loans but did not recieve grants.  Cumulative loan debt based on average for 
those who had positive cumulative debt rather than recieved aid in final year.
Means by Federal Student Aid Status and Comparison with Current Population Survey
CPS 
PopulationAllNo Aid
Unadjusted Expected Family 
Contribution
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Variable Mean Minimum Maximum
Subsidized Loan Eligibility
Actual $7,267 5446 10 33438
Counterfactual* $5,835 6343 0 38460
Effect $2,714 2758 8 23177
Pell Grant Award
Actual $1,480 705 100 2400
Counterfactual * $1,145 897 0 2400
Effect $332 347 1.8 1831
Table 2
* Counterfactual aid estimated by evauluation the federal student aid formula as if  each 




 Mechanical Effect of  Concurrent Enrollment Rule on Pell Grant Awards and 
Subsidized Loan Eligibility
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Dependent Variable: Student Loan Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model: OLS OLS OLS Tobit Tobit
Number Enrolled 873.4*** 751.4*** 222.7 1685.1***
(4.95) (3.98) (0.86) (5.34)
Concurrent Enrollment Indicator 2072.2***
(5.18)
Number of  Dependents 172.1 27.17 193.9 239.9
(1.82) (0.22) (1.25) (1.57)
N 5530 5530 3170 5530 5530
Sample Restrictions Debt > 0 ll(0) ll(0)
Test Number Enrolled =0
F 24.52 15.85 0.74 28.57 26.87
Prob > F =    0.0000 0.0000 0.0001  0.3893 0.0000 0.0000
Table 3
T statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
First Stage Regression 
Controls: tuition, cost of  attendance, unadjusted expected family contribution, dependent 
student indicator, grade point average
8 TABLES 38
Dependent Variable: Student Loan Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model: OLS OLS OLS Tobit
Dummy: 2 Enrolled in Household 982.4*** 860.0*** 499.9 1904.6***
(4.10) (3.46) (1.45) (4.61)
Dummy: 3 Enrolled in Household 2018.4*** 1781.9** 605.7 3582.1***
(3.72) (3.19) (0.80) (3.81)
Dummy: 4 Enrolled in Household -245.5 -607.0 -3508.7 -1220.7
(-0.16) (-0.39) (-1.50) (-0.42)
Dummy: 5 Enrolled in Household 4076.0 3501.2 428.0 9024.7*
(1.48) (1.26) (0.14) (2.06)
Dummy: 6 Enrolled in Household -165.6 -907.2 -4848.6 8382.5
(-0.02) (-0.13) (-0.70) (0.83)
Number of  Dependents in Household 172.6 33.63 194.1
(1.82) (0.27) (1.25)
N 5530 5530 3170 5530
Sample Restrictions Debt > 0 ll(0)
T statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 4
First Stage Regression with Household Enrollment Dummy Variables
Controls: tuition, unadjusted cost of  attendance, unadjusted expected family contribution, 
dependent student indicator and grade point average
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Dependent Variable: Annual Earnings in 1993
Model: OLS (1) (2)
Months older than next younger sibling -427.2
 (-0.03) 
Indicator: (Next) Younger Sibling has Bachelor's Degree 34649.9
(0.11)
N 241 241
T statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 5
Validity Test: Family Fixed Effect
Controls: education, mother's educaiton, father's education, sex, race
Population: NLYS Participants who were 25 in 1993, graduated college college, and 
came from households in the top half  of  the income distribution in 1979.
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Dependent Variable: Age First Attend College 
Model: OLS (1) (2) (3)
Constant 19.43*** 19.27*** 19.37***
(145.86) (213.09) (156.24)
Months Older than Next Younger Sibling -0.00141
(-0.79) 
Younger sibling indicator*  -0.0938*
(-2.30) 
Months Older than next Younger Sibling ^ -1  0.390
(0.47) 
N 555 1027 549
T statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 6
Validity Test: Enrollment Timing
Contols: mother's education, father's education, sex, race, parents' income in 1979
Population: NLYS Participants who were 25 in 1993, attended college, and came from 






Concurrent Enrollment Indicator 2156.8***
(13.40)
Number of  Dependents 176.3**
(2.84)
N 6140
T statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 7
Validity Test: Upgrade Effect
Controls: white, sex, parents' wealth (unadjusted expected 
family contribution)
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Model 1993 1994 1996 1997
OLS
-0.0632 0.104** 0.165*** 0.159***
(-0.46) (2.68) (3.88) (3.34)
N 2150 2420 2440 2480
2SLS - simple instrument
9.469 -0.868 2.572 -1.230
(0.62) (-0.37) (0.76) (-0.47)
N 2100 2360 2370 2420
2SLS - interaction instrument
-2.027 0.480 -0.0655 -0.332
(-0.90) (0.77) (-0.08) (-0.37)
N 2100 2360 2370 2420
2SLS - interaction instrument, conditional on not student
-1.965 0.337 -0.585 -0.335
(-0.76) (0.55) (-0.74) (-0.44)
N 1810 2050 1970 2050
T statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 8
The Effect of  Student Loan Debt on Annual Earnings
 (Conditional on Employment)
Controls: sex, parents' income, race, GPA, tuition, graduate degree, 
age, dependency status
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1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Outcome: Employed
2SLS 0.0339 0.0117 0.0179 0.0147 0.00801
(0.0213) (0.0169) (0.0178) (0.0157) (0.0152)
Two-Step IV Probit 0.170 0.0644 0.104 0.116 0.0808
(0.107) (0.0860) (0.0942) (0.101) (0.0891)
Restricted Sample:
 in labor force 0.0130 0.0000 0.00525 0.00387 0.00727
(0.0111) (0.00842) (0.0111) (0.0101) (0.0102)
non-students 0.0182 0.00535 0.00540 0.0100 0.00336
(0.0144) (0.0121) (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0112)
N 2933 2935 2898 2909 2909
Outcome: Enrolled
2SLS -0.0341 -0.0331 -0.0262 -0.0236 -0.0121
(0.0227) (0.0223) (0.0219) (0.0214) (0.0195)
Two-Step IV Probit -0.100 -0.0970 -0.0737 -0.111 -0.0807
(0.0957) (0.0945) (0.0865) (0.0870) (0.0814)
N 2941 2946 2945 2947 2947
Table 9
The Effect of  $1,000 Student Loan Debt
Controls: sex, number of  dependents, parents' income, white, grade point average, tuition, age and 
graduate degree.
8 TABLES 44
Outcome 1993 1994 1996 1997
Low Earner 0.0167 -0.0137 -0.00998 -0.0226
(0.0221) (0.0190) (0.0231) (0.0245)
(sample: omit students) 0.0140 -0.0204 0.00494 -0.0215
(0.0247) (0.0182) (0.0199) (0.0189)
High Earner -0.0210 0.00801 -0.0220 0.00566
(0.0150) (0.0174) (0.0244) (0.0212)
(sample: omit students) -0.0159 0.00559 -0.0351 0.000427
(0.0162) (0.0181) (0.0250) (0.0175)
N 2085 2368 2349 2416
Table 10
The Effect of  $1,000 Student Loan Debt
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Controls: sex, number of  dependents, parents' income, white, grade point average, tuition, 

















Controls: sex, number of  dependents, parents' income, white, 
grade point average, tuition, age and graduate degree.
The Effect of  $1,000 Student Loan Debt
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
8 TABLES 46
Model OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Student Loan Debt 0.657 0.566 0.244
(thousands of  dollars) (0.924) (0.628) (0.280)
N 750 507 243
Instrument . simple interaction
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 12
The Effect of  Student Loan Debt on Graduate Degree Timing
Controls: sex, number of  dependents, parents' income, white, grade 
point average, tuition, age and graduate degree.
Dependent Variable: Age Complete Graduate Degree
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Table 13
Outcome 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Employed (students ommited)
High Wealth 0.0124 -0.0072 0.0181 0.00106 -0.00167
-0.0179 -0.0159 -0.0165 -0.014 -0.0155
N 808 809 800 800 802
Low Wealth 0.011 0.00867 -0.00577 -0.00508 -0.0122
-0.021 -0.0197 -0.0204 -0.0179 -0.018
N 2124 2125 2097 2108 2106
Enrolled
High Wealth -0.0209 -0.0221 -0.00258 0.0102 0.0146
(0.0195) (0.0199) (0.0184) (0.0187) (0.0186)
N 809 811 811 811 811
Low Wealth -0.00227 -0.00170 -0.00338 0.0132 0.0218
(0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0236) (0.0238) (0.0239)
N 2131 2134 2133 2135 2135
The Effect of  $1,000 Student Loan Debt
Controls: sex, number of  dependents, parents' income, white, grade point average, tuition, 
age and graduate degree.
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Outcome 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Employed (students ommited)
Male -0.000770 0.00250 0.00 0.00442 -0.000388
(0.0152) (0.0130) (0.0123) (0.00963) (0.00921)
N 1003 1004 959 957 996
Female 0.0353* 0.0314* 0.0156 0.0138 0.00487
(0.0157) (0.0153) (0.0120) (0.0115) (0.0110)
N 1374 1365 1323 1346 1358
Enrolled
Male -0.00081 -0.00262 0.00313 0.0264 0.0154
(0.0173) (0.0180) (0.0187) (0.0208) (0.0184)
N 1248 1250 1249 1250 1250
Female -0.00384 0.0000 -0.00633 -0.0205 -0.0220
(0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0167) (0.0173) (0.0169)
N 1693 1696 1696 1697 1697
Table 14
The Effect of  $1,000 Student Loan Debt
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Controls: sex, number of  dependents, parents' income, white, grade point average, 
tuition, age and graduate degree.
49
Part II
Estimating the Impact of
Guaranteed Lending on Student
Loan Default Rates
1 Introduction
The scale of the federal student lending program in the United States has
grown dramatically in recent years. This pattern can be explained by both the
rapidly rising cost of higher education and increasing rates of college enrollment
brought on by shifting labor demands in the domestic economy. This expansion
has drawn attention to the issue of eﬃciency in student lending.
The overall eﬃciency of the federal student lending program depends on a
number of policy design features including the design of the subsidy mechanism,
repayment policies and general eﬃciency of administration. However, much of
the discussion of eﬃciency in student lending has centered on the mechanism
for delivering funds to student borrowers. Specifically, policy makers have ques-
tioned to what extent the Department of Education should outsource loan fi-
nancing, origination, servicing and collection to private lenders. Through the
history of the federal student lending program the private sector has had a
varying role.
In considering the merits of private lender participation in this program it is
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apparent that one should compare the direct costs of administering the program
in each alternative model. The Department of Education should not outsource
any function that it can perform at a lower cost than private contractors. For
instance, the Department of Education can finance loans at the risk free treasury
rate, which is below the financing costs faced by private lenders. This logic
implies that the Department of Education should not outsource loan financing
to private lenders. This type of analysis is clear.
However, there is an additional facet of the analysis that is less apparent
and generally ignored. Student borrowers occasionally fail to repay their debts.
When this happens the government repays the lender on behalf of the student.
This means that tax payers bear the cost when borrowers default on student
loans. This is important insofar as the rate of default is not exogenous – mean-
ing that the manner in which a lender collects the repayment can aﬀect the
likelihood that a borrower defaults. For instance, it may be the case that pri-
vate lenders are superior at encouraging borrowers to repay their debts. If this
is the case, the mechanism for delivering loans to students – either through
private lenders or directly from the government – is an important determinant
of cost in a way that is not immediately apparent from considering expendi-
tures. The existing analyses on student lending eﬃciency ignore the point that
diﬀerent program models can produce varying rates of default. This relation-
ship between private lender participation and the rate of borrower default is
important to policy makers with concerns regarding eﬃciency. This includes
those concerned about reducing government spending in general, and those who
care about reducing spending for the sake of being able to make tax dollars go
further in achieving the goal of raising educational attainment.
In this paper I will describe the history of private sector participation in
federal lending, summarize the existing analyses on this topic and contribute
2 HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL STUDENT LENDING PROGRAM 51
to knowledge on the issue by estimating the eﬀect that the guaranteed lending
program has on student loan default rates.
2 History of the Federal Student Lending Pro-
gram
The U.S. federal government has been in the business of student lending
for nearly six decades. In 1958 policy makers, prompted by a growing concern
regarding the country’s capacity to compete in the international marketplace,
created the National Defense Act to put in place programs that would encourage
young Americans to invest in higher education in scientific fields. One of the
programs created under this act was the first federal student lending program.
A few years later, congress passed legislation that sought to increase attainment
of higher education in a broader manner. The Higher Education Act of 1964
expanded student lending as well as introduced a variety of other programs
to subsidize institutions of higher education. Since that time the federal gov-
ernment has been committed to improving access to higher education through
provision of low cost loans to students.
When first introduced in 1964, the federal lending program operated through
manipulation of the existing private market for student loans. The government
programs reduced student borrowing costs through two distinct mechanisms.
First, the government made interest payments on behalf of students while they
were enrolled in school. This way interest did not begin accruing until the
student received their degree. While this subsidy amounted to a small fraction
of accumulated debt, it solved the cash flow problem that may have stopped
many from enrolling in college. Second, they provided a repayment guarantee
to lenders who made qualifying loans. This meant that a lender would be
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repaid by the government if a student borrower defaulted on their loan. This
made lending to students much less risky and caused them to oﬀer loans with
lower interest rates than they would have oﬀered otherwise. This program,
which relied on private lenders to make loans to students, was a contrast to the
original lending program created just a few years earlier. The student lending
that occurred under the National Defense Act was direct lending – meaning
that the government lent funds from the treasury directly to student borrowers
rather than subsidizing lenders who made loans. The innovation of introducing
private lenders into the process of federal student lending was not arbitrary. The
guaranteed lending program seemed less costly because the budget accounting
rules in use at that time failed to properly account for the cost of providing the
repayment guarantee.
In 1990 legislation was passed that sought to make federal budget account-
ing rules more actuarially fair. Under the new rules long term expenses, like
payments of loan guarantees, would be properly accounted for. This caused
the existing loan program – that utilized private lenders and loan guarantees –
to sudden appear much more costly. Under this new budget regime, a direct
lending program, in which students borrow directly from the treasury, appeared
to be the less costly alternative. Policy makers responded quickly to this in-
novation. In 1992 the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act created a
new program, called Direct Lending, which enabled students to borrow directly
from the government. It was not entirely clear that Direct Lending provided any
real costs savings over the guaranteed lending program, but it was perceived to
be less costly due to the manner in which the budget analysis was performed.
The legislation did not remove the channel through which students could bor-
row from private lenders. Instead, the original program was left in place such
that some students continued to receive financing from private lenders. Both
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programs oﬀered loans with identical terms. The interest rates and repayment
terms were set by legislation. In order to compensate private lenders for of-
fering loans at the below market rates they were paid an interest rate subsidy
that was set by statute. This subsidy was intended to cover the cost of oﬀering
below market rates while leaving enough profit on the table for lenders to will-
ingly participate in the program. The subsidy amount was largely insensitive
to macroeconomic conditions, which proved problematic in the years to come.
The two lending channels operated in parallel for many years before any
significant disruption. There was much discussion during this time over the
relative merits of each program, but no consensus was reached on the superiority
of either. The legitimacy of the public-private partnership in federal student
lending was first seriously called into question in 2007. At that time the media
revealed allegations that tax dollars were being misspent by lenders participating
in the student lending program. In the guaranteed lending program students
were able to select which private lender to use. It was alleged, and ultimately
confirmed, that lenders were oﬀering generous benefits to financial aid oﬃcers
who ushered student borrowers in their direction. Lenders oﬀered cash bonuses
for signing up students for loans and some lenders even went as far as sending
some college representatives on a cruise 5. While aid oﬃcers weren’t able to
force students to borrow from a particular lender, first-student borrowers with
little financial literacy were often easily influenced.
This practice reflected that student lending had become a very profitable
activity and that lenders could gain from increasing their pool of borrowers.
Taxpayers and policy makers objected to this outcome because it meant that
the subsidy being paid to lenders was excessively generous. At that time interest
rates had fallen significantly and lenders could finance student loans cheaply.
(Student loans are generally financed in the secondary market, or securitized,
5http://oha.ed.gov/cases/1996-23-sl.html
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meaning that lenders sell originated loans to a third party investor at a market
interest rate.) This meant that the subsidy paid for their service was greatly
exceeded their cost of originating and financing loans.
Legislation was passed shortly after that time to correct the error that cre-
ated the incentives for lenders to engage in this practice. The College Cost
Reduction and Access Act of 2007 reduced the subsidy that lenders received for
originating federal student loans. The goal was to bring the compensation in
line with the cost of providing loans. Unfortunately, legislators did not foresee
the macroeconomic changes that were about to take place. Shortly after the
act was implemented the United States entered one of the greatest financial
crisis’ in history. The crisis that began in the mortgage lending market caused
interest rates to increase dramatically in nearly all credit markets, including the
secondary market for student loans. This meant that lenders originating federal
student loans would only be able to securitize them at great expense - making
the business of student lending unprofitable at the new subsidy rates. During
the summer of 2008, lenders began informing colleges that they would not be
able to provide loans to their students if the government did not act. This was
a tremendous concern for students who were relying on loans to enroll in fall
courses. The government responded quickly, again, to rectify the problem.
Many lenders called for a repeal of the College Cost Reduction and Access
Act (CCRAA) that had just recently slashed the subsidy that they would receive
to make loans. However, policy makers, who hoped that the financial crisis
would create only a temporary pinch for student lenders, opted for a short
term solution. Congress quickly passed Ensuring Continued Access to Student
Loans Act (ECASLA) which granted authority to the department of education
to put in place an emergency remedy. With that authority the Department of
Education was able to put in place programs that eﬀectively provided capital to
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lenders at below market rates. This succeeded in getting lenders to participate
in lending that fall such that enrollments were largely uninterrupted.
Just a few years later President Barack Obama proposed to eliminate private
lender participation in federal student lending. Based on a 2007 Congressional
Budget Oﬃce Report he argued that switching entirely to a direct lending pro-
gram would provide a significant savings to tax payers. However, the vilification
of banks that was happening during that period may have provided an additional
motivation for terminating the partnership with the financial services industry.
In 2010, he succeeded in this mission by signing into law a bill that eliminated
the guaranteed lending program. This was not an unanticipated action, many
schools had switched from private lending to direct lending following the near
crisis in 2008. From that point forward students borrowed federal student loans
exclusively from the government6. This version of federal lending has been in
place since that time.
3 Program Cost Analysis
Behind all of this turbulence in the market for federal student loans, a num-
ber of studies have sought to provide a careful cost analysis of the two programs
for the purpose of generating better policy. The objective of these studies has
primarily been to identify the relative cost of these two lending programs. Since
each program has a unique structure, the costs are made comparable by es-
timating “subsidy rates.” Subsidy rates are defined as the cost per hundred
dollars of loan origination and are intended to capture all costs associated with
lending. Comparing estimated subsidy rates reveals the relative cost of the two
programs.
The Congressional Budget Oﬃce released a report in 2010 that provided
6Note that the private market continues to provides loans to students outside of this pro-
gram.
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estimates of these subsidy rates. This study was innovative in that it provided
a cost analysis according to the rules of federal budget accounting as well as a
“fair value” analysis. Despite the improvements in budget accounting technology
that came from the Credit Reform Act of 1990, the current budgeting rules
still fail to properly account for the cost of lending programs. Oﬃcial budget
rules understated the cost of direct lending because they do not allow the cost
estimates to take into account either administrative costs or the cost to taxpayers
of taking on risk7. However, the conclusion of the report does not depend on
the accounting methodology used - the subsidy rate for direct lending is lower
than the subsidy rate in the guaranteed lending program. Under fair-value
accounting, the projected subsidy rate for direct lending is 13.4 compared to
20.2 in the guaranteed lending program. This implies that the government
would spend an additional 7 dollars to originate a $100 loan in the guaranteed
program. It is worth noting that the estimated diﬀerence is much greater under
oﬃcial budget accounting rules. The subsidy estimates are -4 and 8, respectively.
According to these estimates both programs are much more costly than the
federal budget implies. These findings were the basis for the Presidents eﬀorts
to eliminate the guaranteed lending program. According to the report, the
switch to Direct Lending would save the country $40 billion over ten years. An
updated report released in 2012 estimated that a switch guaranteed lending
would cost an additional $102 billion over the next ten years.
These subsidy rates are produced by estimating the discounted cash flow of
payments associated with each program. The estimates based on budget rules
use predicted treasury rates to discount future payments while the fair value
method uses discount rates that are adjusted to account for the cost of risk.
Both default and prepayments provide risk in this setting. The expected flow of
payments is based on a given borrower risk profile. This methodology is widely
7See Marron (2010) for a complete discussion of this issue.
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accepted, with some discussion over the appropriate method for discounting.
However, the relative magnitude of the subsidies is robust to varying assump-
tions. One study published by a trade group representing lenders participating
in the guaranteed lending program indicates the opposite finding - guaranteed
lending is less costly than direct lending- but the study methodology is not suﬃ-
ciently transparent for a full review. One point raised in that study that might
be considered further is that the guaranteed lending program produces addi-
tional revenue that was overlooked in the Congressional Budget Oﬃce report.
They indicate that the existence of the guaranteed lending program produced
substantial federal tax liabilities. The magnitude of this eﬀect is uncertain.
These analyses take student default rates as exogenous - meaning that a stu-
dent is no more or less likely to default on their debt having borrowed from one
program rather than the other. Given that private lenders and the government
face very diﬀerent incentives to collect loan repayment, there is good reason to
believe that this may not be a reasonable assumption. Due to issues that I will
discuss in the next section, it is diﬃcult to determine whether the guaranteed
lending program produced lower rates of default than the direct lending pro-
gram. However, its important for policy makers to know the answer to this
question - especially on the eve of the reauthorization of the Higher Education
Act, scheduled to take place in 2013. As policy makers consider how to mod-
ify this program they should be thinking of re-involving private lenders to the
degree that they have an advantage over the government on certain aspects of
lending.
4 Estimation Challenges
By creating a simple model of decision making it is possible to identify some
predictions regarding the behavior of lenders in this market. To begin, I will
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identify a few legislative details that shape this program. First, all student
borrowers pay the same rate of interest on federal loans, regardless of their
propensity to default. In order for the lenders to access the repayment guarantee
provided by the Department of Education they must charge the same interest
rate to all borrowers. Likewise, lenders are paid a fixed rate to originate student
loans. This amount it not sensitive to the likelihood that a given borrower
will default. Therefore, lenders maximize profits by strategically engaging in
profitable lending relationships. Lenders are prohibited from discriminating
between student borrowers within an institution. Therefore, a lender will engage
in a lending relationship with an institution only if the anticipated average rate
of default, based on institution characteristics, implies a positive rate of return.
(In practice, the threshold return for lender participation is determined by the
opportunity cost of the capital committed to the transaction.) Schools generally
participate in either direct or guaranteed lending, such that students do not
have the opportunity to select the source of their federal loans. However, within
guaranteed lending borrowers can take loans from any lender that participated
in lending at their school. Financial aid oﬃces provide students with a list of
lenders that have established a lending relationship with the school. Students
are able to borrow from lenders not included on this list, but it is costly for
them to do so because of the lack of infrastructure connecting the lender with
the school.
The lender’s decision is illustrated in equation (1). E (π) indicates the rate
of return on a dollar lent at institution j. The institution level rate of default
rate, dj , is used to weight the potential loan outcomes; default and repayment.
In the case of repayment, the transaction yields profits equal to the diﬀerence
between the the rate of interest promised by legislation, rLegislation, and the
cost of the capital used to finance the loan, rlender. Note that rLegislation is
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paid to lenders from the Department of Education and is the only revenue that
lenders receive for making loans. This amount is determined by legislation and
is intended to fully compensate lenders for their services. In the case of default,
the transaction yields losses equal to the non-guaranteed portion of the loan
(G − 1, where G denotes the portion guaranteed by the government) plus any
expenses related to redeeming this guarantee (in practice lenders must prove
that they have properly serviced the loan). Equation (2) illustrates the notion
that lenders only engage with institutions for which they anticipate a positive
expected return.
E (π) = (1− dj) (rlegislation − rlender (xi)) + dj ((G− 1)− Crecovery) (1)
FFELPj =

1 if (1− dj) (rlegislation − rlender (xi)) + dj ((G− 1)− Crecovery) ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(2)
Given this specification, there exists a threshold level of the default rate,
d∗, at which the transaction yields zero expected profit. Since profits are de-
creasing in the rate of default, lenders would refrain from engaging in lending
with institutions for which the expected rate of default is above this level, as it
would yield a negative expected return. The Department of Education serves
as the lender of last resort to all schools. If a school is unable to line up lenders
to originate loans to their students they have the option to participate in the
Direct Lending Program. Schools are only prohibited from participating in the
Direct Lending program if they lose eligibility for federal financial aid programs
altogether.
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FFELPj =

1 if E(dj) < d∗
0 otherwise
(3)
This implies that the expected rate of default at institutions where private
lenders issue loans will be less than the rate of default at other institutions
(equation 3).
E(dj | FFELPj = 1) < E(dj | FFELPj = 0) (4)
This illustrates the potential for adverse selection in the guaranteed lending
program. If lenders behaved in this manner, then the pool of borrowers who
received loans from the direct lending program will diﬀer systematically from
those who received loans from the guaranteed lending program. While the
incentive for this type of behavior seems to exist, it is not possible to verify the
existence of selection through observation of realized default rates as they are
determined by both the underlying characteristics of the borrower as well as the
collection behavior employed by the lender.
Given the design of the student lending program, there is reason to think
that realized default rates are not independent of the originating loan program.
First, it is necessary to understand that a lenders collection behaviors can aﬀect
the probability that a loan is repaid. These behaviors include educating the
borrower about repayment through counseling, providing customer service for
borrowers in repayment and exerting eﬀort on other dimensions of loan servicing.
This mechanism is illustrated in the following modified profit equation. In this
specification, the rate of default is a decreasing function of collection eﬀort, ej .
Collection eﬀort imposes a cost, θej , on the lender. A lender will select a level of
collection eﬀort such that the marginal return of eﬀort is equal to the marginal
cost of exertion, θ.
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E(πj) = (1− dj (ej)) (rlegislation − rlender (xi))+dj (ej) ((G− 1)− Crecovery)−θej
(5)
The marginal return of collection eﬀort is decreasing in the fraction of the
loan backed with a guarantee. Thus, an increase in guarantee coverage will









This implies that conditional upon having originated a loan, collection eﬀort
will decrease upon introduction of a non-trivial guarantee. To the extent that
the government behaves as if it has the same motive for profit as private lending
institutions, this exercise indicates that collection eﬀort in the direct lending
program will exceed that in guaranteed lending program resulting in a lower
incidence of loan default in the direct lending program.
E(dj | FFELPj = 1, Xj), < E(dj | FFELPj = 0, Xj) (8)
4.1 Mitigating Eﬀects
If one believes that the profit motive of the managing government agency
matches that of private lenders, there are other reasons to suggest that rates of
default may diﬀer across the two programs even with symmetric eﬀorts. First,
the returns to lending may extend beyond the initial transaction for private
lenders. A large fraction of the loans in this market are originated by institu-
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tions that engage in a variety of lending practices (i.e. private student loans,
mortgages, credit cards). Establishing a relationship with a borrower through
student lending may increase the likelihood that the borrower engages with the
lender for future, higher yield transactions. A benefit of this nature may provide
incentive for a lender to exert more collection eﬀort than they would otherwise.
Second, eﬀort costs likely diﬀer between the administering government agency
and private lenders. Due to economies of scale, private lenders likely face lower
marginal cost of collection eﬀorts. This mitigates the reduction of collection
eﬀort caused by introduction of the guarantee. Given these diﬀerences in in-
centives and eﬃciency, it is not apparent that the moral hazard in this setting
results in higher realized default rates in the guaranteed student lending pro-
gram. Empirical evidence is necessary to identify the relative magnitudes of
these eﬀects.
5 Data
The Postsecondary Education Participants System (PEPS), administered by
the Department of Education, cohort default rate by institution. The published
rates are based on loans originated under the federal lending programs and do
not include private education loans. Default rates are calculated at the level
of repayment cohort and are available on a fiscal year basis beginning in 1992.
Since student loans have very long maturities, up to thirty years, shorter periods
are used to capture information regarding the propensity to default. During the
period of time considered in this study, the cohort default rate was defined as
the ratio of borrowers entering repayment in a given year who default within the
first two years to the total number of borrowers entering repayment in that year.
While this measure does not perfectly capture the likelihood of full repayment,
there is not reason to believe that this measure diﬀers from total defaults in a
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systematic manner. It should be suﬃcient for lenders to make appropriate entry
decisions.
In addition to this data on school level loan default rates, I utilize institu-
tion characteristics published in the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data
System, also administered by the Department of Education. Data is available
for all institutions that participate in either federal lending program.
6 Evidence of Adverse Selection
While causal inference is limited by the issues identified in the previous
section, it is useful to observe realized default rates across the two programs.
The default outcomes for the cohort of loans entering repayment in 2007 are
available in Table 1. As stated in the last row of the table, the average rate of
default for the cohort of borrowers entering repayment in 2007 is 7.0 percent.
Recalling the definition of default, this implies that 7.0 percent of all borrowers
who entered repayment in 2007 defaulted on their loan within the first two
years of repayment. The rate of default observed in the direct lending program
is a bit higher, at 8.3 percent. Likewise, the rate of default in the guaranteed
lending program was 6.8 percent. While this observation is suggestive of adverse
selection, it is not conclusive since realized diﬀerences in loan default rates are
attributable to the combination of diﬀerences in the underlying borrower pools
as well as diﬀerences in lender collection eﬀorts.
The overall relative default rates are not echoed in the default rates within
particular institution types. In fact, for those institution types which both di-
rect and guaranteed lending take place, lower default rates are observed in direct
lending for all but one category of institution, non-degree programs. The lower
overall average default rate in the guaranteed student lending program appear
to reflect the distribution of institution types serviced by the program. For
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instance, 100 percent of lending at medical and law school took place through
the guaranteed student lending program. One would imagine that this cate-
gory of institution would tend to have extremely low levels of default among its
borrowers regardless of servicing eﬀorts. Likewise, the prevalence of guaranteed
lending is low in categories of institutions that report higher default rates (i.e.
less-than-two-year and proprietary institutions). These findings are consistent
with adverse selection of the nature described in the previous section. Mean-
while, the observed relative default rates within institution types is suggests
that participation in the guaranteed lending program increases the rate of de-
fault. This is consistent with the model in which the eﬀect of moral hazard on
collection eﬀort outweighs any benefit from an eﬃciency advantage or additional
eﬀort due to wanting to maintain a relationship with the lender.
The previous analysis suggests that selection takes place at the level of
institution-type. In some institution categories (i.e. law and medical) guar-
anteed lending takes place at every institution, while at others they have a less
than complete presence. It may be the case that this is due to within category
selection. However, for this to be the case it must be possible for lenders to
accurately predict default probabilities based on observable institution charac-
teristics. Note that it is conceivable in this setting to believe that the information
contained in the data sets used in this study matches the information set used
by private lenders to make entry decisions. Therefore, the purpose of this exer-
cise is to simulate the analysis that is potentially performed by lenders making
decisions regarding entry. In order to better understand the ability of lenders to
predict institution level default, I have provided the results of an ordinary least
squares regression of the 2007 cohort default rate on historical default rates and
other institution characteristics. This is reported in Table 2. The R squared of
0.544 implies a moderate degree of predictability. The individual coeﬃcient es-
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timates indicate that in addition to the default rates observed in previous fiscal
years, both rate of graduation and degree of geographic remoteness (this measure
is an index increasing in distance from metropolitan centers) have statistically
significant correlation with the observed rate of default. The mechanism for
the relationship between default rate and graduation rate is easily understood;
individuals who do not complete their program of study are much more likely to
have insuﬃcient income to repay education loans. The mechanical relationship
between institution geography and default rate is less apparent. Regardless, the
coeﬃcient estimates indicate that individual institution characteristics can be
used by lenders to predict profitability of engaging in lending at a particular
institution.
While this analysis suggests that it is possible for lenders to discriminate
between institutions based on characteristics that predict default, it does not
imply that they must be doing so. Table 3 provides coeﬃcient estimates from
a set of regressions aimed at determining the extent to which institution char-
acteristics determine participation in the guaranteed lending program. In the
first specification an indicator for guaranteed student lending program partic-
ipation is regressed on the complete set of institution characteristics using an
ordinary least squares model. The second column repeats this exercise in a
probit model. While it seems that part-time enrollment has a significant rela-
tionship with the likelihood of participation in the guaranteed lending program,
the model predicts a relatively small portion in the total variation of the guar-
anteed lending indicator (FFELP). The third column of this tables provides
coeﬃcient estimates from a probit regression of the guaranteed lending indica-
tor on a predicted default rate based on all of the institution characteristics
included in the first two specifications in this table. Likewise, this measure of
default has a correlation with the guaranteed lending indicator that is consistent
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with the theoretical profit model, but explains only a small portion of the full
variation in the guaranteed lending indicator.
The relationship between predicted default and likelihood of guaranteed
lending is illustrated in Figure 1. In this graphic, the predicted value from
a probit regression of the 2007 guaranteed lending indicator on the predicted
default rate from a regression of realized 2007 default rate on institution char-
acteristics and historical default rates. It is apparent from this illustration that
the frequency of guaranteed lending is decreasing in the predicted default rate.
This relationship is consistent with the model presented in the previous sec-
tion. While a strict interpretation of the model would imply that the rate of
participation falls to zero above a threshold level of predicted default, imprecise
estimates of default would result in the observed pattern.
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The results in this section indicate that default rates are somewhat pred-
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icable based on observable institution characteristics and that some degree of
adverse selection takes place. It seems apparent that lenders select into lending
relationships based on institution type, but may not generate more complex de-
fault expectations within institution types based on published enrollment char-
acteristics. This might imply that the profit model outlined in the previous
section determines only a small fraction of the sorting between programs. It
may also be the case that the combination of interest and relationship value are
suﬃcient to outweigh the cost of default at even the riskiest institutions, such
that lending is profitable regardless of predicted default rate.
7 Estimation Strategies
Recall that the objective of this work is to estimate the eﬀect of guaranteed
lending on default rates relative to the direct lending program. The purpose of
examining the sorting between programs is to understand the extent to which
selection complicates the estimation of this eﬀect. Equation 9 defines the pa-
rameter that I seek to estimate. The notation is as defined in section 4. Since
only one of the terms on the right hand side of the equation is observed for any
single institution, j, this value cannot be immediately measured.
FFELP Effectj = E(dj | FFELPj = 1, Xj)−E(dj | FFELPj = 0, Xj) (9)
In order to generate an unbiased estimate of this eﬀect, it is necessary to
adequately control for the selection into guaranteed lending. There are two dis-
tinct cases in which diﬀerent estimation techniques must be applied. First, in
the case that sorting between the programs depends only on observable factors,
then properly controlling for covariates will be suﬃcient to produce unbiased es-
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timates. The estimates will reflect the true eﬀect of participation in guaranteed
lending only if the variation in treatment that is not explained by observable
factors is exogenous to factors determining the rate of default. If this is not
the case, then methods must be applied to isolate variation in treatment that
is exogenous to cohort default rates.
7.1 Selection on Observable Institution Characteristics
The evidence reported in the previous section suggests that lenders base
their entry decisions in part on observable institution characteristics. Additional
data is likely obtained through private interactions with institution oﬃcials (i.e.
changes in institution policies that would aﬀect future borrowing or repayment
behavior), but it is conceivable that this adds little to the lenders ability to pre-
dict rates of default. Therefore, unbiased estimates of the eﬀect of participation
in the guaranteed lending program can likely be obtained using ordinary least
squares regression. In order to properly correct for the selection, the set of infor-
mation used to determine participation must be included as control variables in
the form in which they are used by lenders. Equation 10 illustrates a regression
of this form.
dj = β0 + β1FFELPj + β2Xj + εj (10)
The ordinary least squares coeﬃcient estimates from this model are reported
in table 4. The specifications illustrated here represent various combinations of
year eﬀects, individual institution eﬀects and control variables. In the first two
specifications, the coeﬃcient estimate indicates a negative relationship between
participation in guaranteed lending and cohort default rates. This contrasts
sharply with the third and fourth specifications in which the coeﬃcient estimates
suggest that participation in guaranteed lending raises cohort default rates by
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between 7 and 9 tenths of a percentage point. The diﬀerence between these
two sets of specifications is the inclusion of institution characteristics as control
variables. The change in sign of the estimated treatment eﬀect is attributable
to the selection based on institution characteristics that determine default.
This specification is estimated again separately for each type of institution.
The results are reported in table 4. These estimates indicate that the eﬀect
identified in the general specification is being driven primarily by proprietary
schools. These estimates indicate that participation in guaranteed lending will
raise the rate of default at a proprietary school by 3.8 percentage points. The
eﬀect of guaranteed lending at public and private institutions is not statistically
significant (0.4 and -0.8 percentage points, respectively).
If lenders determine participation using a more complex function of these
characteristics then the previously stated model will fail to properly correct for
the selection and may produce a biased estimate of the eﬀect of participation
in guaranteed lending on default rates. In this case, propensity score matching
may be a better technique for identifying this eﬀect.
In the first stage of the procedure a probit regression will estimate the
propensity score. Alternative specifications using interactions and high order
terms are utilized to mimic the analyses performed by lenders when making de-
terminations regarding entry. Equation (11) illustrates a potential specification.
FFELPj = β0 + β1Xj1 + β2Xj2 + . . .+ α1(Xj1)
2 + α2(Xj2)
2 + εj (11)
In the second stage the sample is stratified by propensity score and treatment
eﬀects are estimated within each block. The weighted mean of within block es-
timates will provide an unbiased estimate of the average treatment eﬀect on the
treated. The results from this exercise are reported in table 5. The estimate
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of the treatment eﬀect identified using this strategy does not diﬀer from those
obtained using linear regression. While not statistically significant, this estima-
tion strategy suggests that default rates were heighten by 0.9 percentage point
by participation in the guaranteed lending program.
7.2 Selection on Unobservable Characteristics
An alternative strategy for estimating the eﬀect of guaranteed lending is to
observe the within institution variation in default rate that results from switch-
ing from one program to another. Within the population of 3800 institutions,
669 institutions switch from the direct lending program to guaranteed lending
program during the observed period. While it may be unreasonable to believe
that switching to the guaranteed lending is an exogenous event, observing the
change in default rate that occurs during the period of the switch can help pro-
vide some context for the previous estimates. By utilizing adequate controls,
the change in default that accompanies the program change can be attributed to
the treatment from the guaranteed lending program. Equation 14 illustrates an
alternative method for estimating the eﬀect of participation in the guaranteed
lending program on default rates.
Default Ratejt = αj + αt + αt,SWITCH + θSWITCHjt + εjt (12)
In this specification, default rate is determined by an institution fixed eﬀect,
year eﬀect, switcher specific year eﬀect and the period specific switching eﬀects.
Note that in this setting, institution cohorts do not switch immediately from
one program to the other. When an institution switches to guaranteed lending,
multiple cohorts may receive treatment from both programs. For instance, the
cohort of students who have partially completed a multi-year program when
guaranteed lending is introduced will have a portfolio of debt containing both
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direct and guaranteed loans. As a result, cohort default rates will adjust to par-
ticipation in guaranteed lending over multiple periods. Therefore, the parameter
θ will capture only a partial treatment eﬀect when SWITCHjt takes the value
one in a year in which the cohort of borrowers entering repayment have a mixed
portfolio of loans. Since institutions included in this sample have programs of
varying durations, I have provided a few definitions of this parameter in the
following estimates. In the definitions used, SWITCHjt takes the value of one
in either the first, second, third or fourth year following the switch to guaran-
teed lending. Of the institutions that switch to guaranteed lending during this
period, nearly two thirds are non-degree programs, which generally have short
durations. This implies that the eﬀect guaranteed lending on default rates will
be observable in the first or second period following the program change.
The estimates from this model are provided in table 6. Note that the values
in the table correspond to the θ parameter in the previous equation. The esti-
mates do not indicate a strong relationship between participation in guaranteed
lending and loan cohort default rates. However, when defined as the diﬀerence
in default rate three years following the switch to guaranteed lending, the point
estimate, 0.88, is of a similar magnitude as the estimates from the ordinary
least squares and propensity score matching estimation techniques; implying
that participation in the guaranteed lending program raises cohort default rate
by nearly one percentage point.
Inference from these estimates is limited due to the potential endogeneity of
switching to or from guaranteed lending. Since lenders profits are decreasing in
borrower default rates, we might expect that banks would begin making guar-
anteed lending services available to an institution when it anticipates a decrease
in the rate of default. Likewise, banks would withdraw their lending services
when they anticipated a rise in defaults on the horizon. As a result, switching
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to guaranteed lending might generally occur in concert with a fall in defaults.
This would introduce a downward bias to the coeﬃcients from the switching
estimate strategy. Therefore it is likely that guaranteed lending raises borrower
default rates by more than the estimates in table 6 indicate. The inclusion of the
switcher specific year eﬀect is included to mitigate the bias created by the corre-
lation between cohort default rate and the introduction of guaranteed lending.
This does not appropriately correct for bias if the introduction in guaranteed
lending occurs in tandem with a discrete change in the rate of default. However,
it seems unlikely that this is the nature of the problem. Alternatively, lenders
likely introduce their services at those institutions that have realized steadily
improving cohort default rates.
8 Conclusion
The estimates from each of the specifications above indicate that institution
participation in guaranteed lending will raise cohort default rates by slightly less
than one percentage point; a small amount relative to variation in default rates
across institutions. This implies that the moral hazard created by the guarantee
depresses eﬀort to the extent that it outweighs any eﬃciency advantage. This
suggests that existing studies may have underestimated the cost of guaranteed
lending.
Additionally, the issue of direct versus guaranteed lending is not unique to
student lending. The federal government subsidizes a number of loan markets
including the market for mortgages, small business loans and farm loans. In ad-
dition to these examples, the recent Target Asset Relief Program (2008), aimed
at bringing stability to the financial services industry, and Ensuring Continued
Access to Student Loans Act (2008), which provided liquidity to the secondary
market for student loans, are examples of emergency direct lending programs.
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Given the scale of government intervention in credit markets, it is important to
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Dependent Variable: Cohort Default Rate
Ordinary Least Squares
Institution Fixed Effect x x x
Year Fixed Effect x x x
Controls (see below) x x
FFELP Indicator (lagged two periods) -0.558*** -0.425** 0.674* 0.892*
(-3.55) (-2.61) (2.14) (2.31)
By School Type-
Public:
FFELP Indicator (lagged two periods) 0.437
(1.30)
Private:
FFELP Indicator (lagged two periods) -0.768 
(-1.22)
Proprietary:
FFELP Indicator (lagged two periods) 3.810*
(2.32)
N 31022 31022 6730 6730
t statistics in parenthesis
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Estimate the Effect of  FFELP of  Default
Table 4
Controls: Indicators (two-year, less than two-year, proprietary, public) tuition, graduation rate, 
enrollment, degree of  geographic remoteness
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Estimating the Temporal Pattern
of Earnings Loss Faced by
Displaced Workers Eligible for
Trade Adjustment Assistance
1 Introduction
There is concern among workers and policy makers alike that trade and
outsourcing have adverse eﬀects on some domestic workers. The is over the
challenges that seem to be facing workers who are displaced from employment
due to international competition. It is theorized that these workers face addi-
tional earnings losses when displaced from employment that are not experienced
by workers from other industries. These losses are thought to be a result of ei-
ther a decrease in demand for labor within the trade aﬀected industry or the
costs associated with regaining employment in a diﬀerent occupation. Consider
the case of a worker displaced from employment in an industry exposed to trade.
It is conceivable that because of the decreased demand for labor in this industry
that the worker would have to find reemployment in a diﬀerent industry. They
may be less productive in their new position and receive a decreased wage as a
result. Alternatively, they may have to forgo wages in order to receive additional
training. This scenario could result in losses to the worker that would not have
been incurred if the original industry of employment had not been exposed to
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trade. On the other hand, this worker might become immediately reemployed
in an adjacent industry using an unchanged skill set. In this scenario the fact
that the worker’s previous industry was exposed to trade would not impact the
losses that he or she faced as a result of displacement. These two descriptions
do not exhaust the possible aftermaths of displacement, but they do illustrate
the question that remains unanswered in this discussion. Do workers displaced
from industries exposed to trade face greater losses as a result of displacement
than do workers from other industries? This is the question examined in this
paper.
The answer to this question is of interest to policy makers who seek to ade-
quately compensate workers for the losses that they incur as a result of policy
changes that expose industries to foreign competition. All unemployed workers
in the United States are eligible to receive support from the Department of La-
bor’s Unemployment Insurance programs, but workers displaced from certain
industries are eligible for additional benefits. The Trade Adjustment Assistance
Program provides benefits to displaced workers from industries that the De-
partment of Labor classifies as having been adversely aﬀected by international
trade. This includes both trade of final goods and services and outsourcing of
production. The program provides extended unemployment benefits as well as
additional health care provisions and training benefits. The existence of this
program reveals the belief of policy makers and constituents that workers dis-
placed by trade face losses in excess of those faced by other displaced workers.
Expansion of this program often coincides with policy changes that remove bar-
riers to international competition.
In order for policy to adequately support workers displaced by trade it is nec-
essary to understand the manner in which their experiences diﬀer from those of
other displaced workers. To characterize these workers’ experiences I estimate
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the temporal pattern of earnings loss faced by workers eligible for Trade Ad-
justment Assistance relative to the earnings loss faced by workers displaced for
other reasons. I use the event study framework first used by Jacobson, LaLonde
and Sullivan. I also estimate the diﬀerences in reemployment rates between
workers eligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance and other displaced workers.
I find that during 2001-03 displaced workers eligible for aid from the Trade
Adjustment Assistance program faced smaller earnings losses in the month of
displacement relative to other displaced workers, but their losses were greater in
the first month following displacement. Beyond the first month after displace-
ment the experiences of the two groups of workers did not diﬀer. In addition, I
find that these workers faced heightened rates of unemployment in the first few
months following displacement.
2 Trade Adjustment Assistance
The Trade Adjustment Assistance Program was established under the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 and the later Trade Act of 1974. It was established as
a way to mitigate the losses that would be incurred by certain workers when
these two pieces of legislation removed barriers to trade. President Kennedy
captured the sentiment of policy makers with the following remark: “When
considerations of national policy make it desirable to avoid higher tariﬀs, those
injured by that competition should not be required to bear the full brunt of
the impact. Rather, the burden of economic adjustment should be borne in
part by the Federal Government.” Implicit in this perspective is the assumption
that workers displaced by foreign competition will face greater hardship from
displacement than workers displaced for other reasons.
In order to aid these workers the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program of-
fers a variety of reemployment services to eligible workers. These services include
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income support, health benefits, training, job-search allowances and relocation
stipends. The income support provided by the program provides allowance pay-
ments to workers after they have exhausted their eligibility for unemployment
insurance benefits. The aim of these policies is to provide support for displaced
workers until they are able to regain employment comparable to the ones that
they lost. The training component is an important part of the program because
these workers may need to switch industries in order to regain employment.
Eligible workers can receive benefits to pay for classroom training, on-the-job
training, apprenticeship programs, post-secondary education, remedial educa-
tion or other customized training programs.
Not all displaced workers are eligible to receive assistance through the Trade
Adjustment Assistance Program. Only workers who are displaced from indus-
tries that face international competition due to a free trade agreement are el-
igible to participate. This includes industries where production has shifted
oversees, but also upstream industries (suppliers) that have been negatively
aﬀected. Workers displaced from industries downstream from trade aﬀected in-
dustries are also eligible to participate. Following revisions to policy in 2006,
workers producing services, rather than goods, also became eligible to receive
support from the program. In practice workers, firms or employee representa-
tives file a petition with the Department of Labor in order to be approved for
eligibility.
3 Review of Related Literature
The existing literature on this topic provides extensive evidence on the
macroeconomic impacts of trade but is more sparse when it comes to estimat-
ing the eﬀects of trade on individual workers. The most comprehensive work on
this topic has been done by Lori G. Kletzer. In her 2004 book, she character-
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izes job displacement caused by trade. She estimates the eﬀect of displacement
due to trade on earnings and employment. She finds that workers from trade
aﬀected industries have lower rates of reemployment following displacement,
but concludes that this is due to the characteristics of workers displaced from
these industries rather than a structural cause. Kletzer provides a similar find-
ing regarding earnings. In the short run workers displaced from trade exposed
industries do not face greater earnings loss than workers displaced from other
industries.
Further evidence that workers displaced by trade do not face excess hard-
ship is provided by Douglas Irwin (2002). Like Kletzer, he finds that work-
ers displaced by trade do not fare worse that other types of displaced workers
once you control for individual worker characteristics. Displacements caused by
trade tend to occur in manufacturing industries which disproportionately em-
ploy workers with lower levels of education. Baicker and Rehavi (2004) show
that recipients of Trade Adjustment Assistance are diﬀerent from other displaced
workers on a few other dimensions. Recipients of Trade Adjustment Assistance
are also disproportionately female and older. Marcal (2001) shows that union
workers are also disproportionately covered by Trade Adjustment Assistance.
These studies suggest that workers in trade aﬀected industries do not fare
any worse than other workers, but they do not explicit consider the set of work-
ers eligible for the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program. A couple of earlier
studies have tackled that question. These studies found that during the 1970
workers eligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance did not fare worse than other
displaced workers. In fact, they found that these workers had a higher likeli-
hood of being recalled to their job, switched industries less often and did not
face longer spells of unemployment (Corson and Nicholson, 1981; Richardson,
1982).
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This paper contributes to the existing literature by providing an updated
characterization of the earnings loss and unemployment experiences of displaced
workers eligible for participation in the modern Trade Adjustment Assistance
Program. There have been significant changes to the Trade Adjustment Assis-
tance program since the period considered in the existing studies. In addition to
the changes to the program that took place during this time, structure change
may have occurred in the economy such that displaced workers face diﬀerent
experiences. The evidence provided here should be used by policy makers to
justify future reform of the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program.
4 Identification Strategy
The objective of this study is to estimate the diﬀerence in earnings loss
between displaced workers eligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance and other
displaced workers. I use the event study framework established by Jacobson,
LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) to estimate this diﬀerence. Implementing this
framework requires a series of dummy variables, representing period from dis-
placement, that are used to eﬀectively align the displacement events of all work-
ers in the sample. This method allows the estimation to be based on variation
across both time and worker characteristics. The dummy variables indicate the
number of periods that have passed since the displacement event are such that:
Dkit = 1 if worker i was displaced in period t-k.
Next, it is assumed that a workers current hourly wage is determined by
the following model. Individual characteristics (fixed and time variant), a year
eﬀect and the number of period from a displacement event determine variation
in wage.




k + εit (1)
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Dkit is defined for any value of k, but for the purpose of a regression analysis
it is necessary to limit k in order to have suﬃciently small number of regressors.
Since the objective of the study is to determine the necessity of the additional
unemployment benefits provided by the Trade Adjustment Assistance program,
I will limit the period of study to three months prior to displacement through 6
months after displacement (k takes on values -3 through 6). For the subsequent
analysis, the time variant characteristics included in xit are age, occupation
tenure, educational attainment (dummy variables for education classification)
and union status. Fixed eﬀects estimation is performed such that αi captures
both observable and unobservable individual characteristics. A series of year
dummies are also included as regressors in order to capture universal time eﬀects.
In order to determine the additional losses, if any, that are faced by those
workers eligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance I introduce an additional set
of dummy variables that are interacted with an indicator for Trade Adjustment
Assistance Eligibility. This indicator, denoted TAAit, takes the value 1 if worker
i was displaced from an industry that was classified as eligible for participation
in the Trade Adjustment Assistance program any time during the duration of
the survey (2001-2003). This modified specification is illustrated in equation 2.
(4)








k + εit (2)
It is useful to consider the following expectations:
E (wit | Dis = 1, TAAit = 0, xit)− E (wit | Dis = 0∀s, TAAit = 0, xit) (3)
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E (wit | Dis = 1, TAAit = 1, xit)− E (wit | Dis = 0∀s, TAAit = 1, xit) (4)
Expression (4) gives the earnings loss at any time t for individual i who has
faced displacement in period s from an industry with low exposure to outsourc-
ing. Expression (5) gives the earnings loss at any time t for individual i who has
faced displacement in period s from an industry that is eligible for participation
in the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program. Substituting equation (3) in both
expressions (4) and (5) illustrates how an estimate for earnings loss is formed.
E
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Expression (6) simplifies to the summation of the estimated coeﬃcients on
the dummy variables indicating time from displacement. This serves as the es-
timate of earnings losses experienced by displaced workers not eligible for Trade
Adjustment Assistance. Similarly, expression (7) simplifies to the summation
over the series of coeﬃcients on the period from displacement dummies and the
estimated coeﬃcient on the dummy variables indicating Trade Adjustment As-
sistance Eligibility. The sum over the estimated coeﬃcients (ζk ) on the Trade
Adjustment Assistance indicator interacted with the period from displacement
dummy serves as an estimate of the additional losses incurred by displaced
workers eligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance.
This identification strategy is an application of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
technique which relies on the non-displaced workers’ earnings to serve as a valid
counterfactual for those workers who did experience displacement (Jacobson,
Sullivan and Lalonde, 1993). The extension to the specification that is being
developed in this paper also relies on the assumption that workers in industries
eligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance are not systematically diﬀerent from
other displaced workers. I cannot explicitly test these assumptions, but com-
paring these groups of workers on observable dimensions can indicate whether
they are reasonable.
Table 3 reports mean characteristics for workers from three groups: non-
displaced, all displaced, and displaced workers eligible for Trade Adjustment
Assistance. Comparing the first and second columns indicates that employed,
non-displaced, workers are largely diﬀerent from displaced workers. On average,
employed workers are more likely to have a college degree, have worked in their
chosen profession for a longer duration and are older. Given these diﬀerences,
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it is reasonable to question whether the earnings of non-displaced workers can
serve as a valid counterfactual for the unobserved earnings of displaced workers.
It is likely that displaced workers have lower earnings capacity and that esti-
mates from this specification will overstate the losses that they incur as a result
of displacement. However, displaced workers eligible for Trade Adjustment As-
sistance do not seem to be largely diﬀerent from average displaced worker from
other industries. They are slightly more educated than the average displaced
worker, but they have spent comparable time working in their occupations and
are of similar age. This implies that it is reasonable to use the observed earn-
ings of displaced workers as the counterfactual earnings for displaced workers
from industries eligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance. While the estimates of
earnings loss may overstate the true damages associated with displacement, es-
timates of the additional earnings loss experiences by workers eligible for Trade
Adjustment Assistance will not be biased. This evidence suggests that this is a
valid framework for determining whether workers eligible for Trade Adjustment
Assistance experience losses in excess of other displaced workers.
5 Data
I use the 2001 Survey of Income and Program Participation to estimate these
models. This data set comes from a nationally representative survey of house-
holds in the civilian, non-institutionalized U.S. population. It contains monthly
data that is obtained through surveys occurring every four months between
2001 and 2003. The high frequency of interviews means that participants are
likely to recall accurate earnings information. This makes is feasible to estimate
estimates short term variation in earnings.
This data is matched with records from the Department of Labor regard-
ing oﬃcial Trade Adjustment Assistance petition determinations. I collect all
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petition determinations that occur during the period covered by the Survey of
Income and Program Participation and use this to classify the program eligi-
bility for each Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code appearing in the
Survey of Income and Program Participation. I ignore time variation in Trade
Adjustment Assistance eligibility and classify Standard Industry Classification
(SIC) codes as eligible throughout the entire period if an instance of petition
approval occurs at any time. In this sample less than one percent of workers
(0.5%) are employed in industries classified as eligible for Trade Adjustment As-
sistance. This fraction increases slightly (0.8%) when you consider only workers
who experience displacement during this period.
6 Results
I begin by estimating the temporal pattern of earnings loss faced by all
displaced workers. I use the specification presented in section three but omit
the term that interacts the period from displacement indicator with Trade Ad-
justment Assistance Eligibility. The estimates from the ordinary least squares
regression of monthly earned income on period from displacement dummies with
fixed eﬀects are reported in the first column of table 1. The estimates indicate
that earnings loss begins as early as two months prior to displacement. Dur-
ing the period of displacement workers lose an average of $750 relative to their
counterfactual non-displacement earnings. The monthly earnings loss increases
further in the month following displacement to $874 and then begins to dimin-
ish. Statistically significant losses persist throughout the six months following
displacement. Recall that the unobservable diﬀerences between employed and
displaced workers likely cause these estimates to overstate the true loss.
I report estimates of the temporal earnings loss faced by workers eligible
for trade adjustment assistance in the second column of table 1 . Ordinary
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least squares with fixed eﬀects is used to estimate the coeﬃcients in equation
3. The coeﬃcients in the lower half of the table correspond to ζ in equation
3. These provide the estimate of the additional loss incurred by those workers
designated eligible for the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program. It is necessary
to sum these coeﬃcients with the corresponding coeﬃcients from the top of the
table in order to obtain an estimate of the total earnings loss relative to non-
displaced workers. The point estimates indicate that workers eligible for Trade
Adjustment Assistance actually face a smaller earnings loss during the period of
displacement compared to other displaced workers. The estimates indicate that
their loss is smaller by $530 (compared to the estimated loss of $757 faced by
other displaced workers). During the first month after displacement the earnings
losses of workers eligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance exceed the losses
of other displaced workers by $372. The diﬀerence in earnings loss becomes
negligible beyond the first month following displacement. These estimates of
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Figure 1: Monthly Earnings Loss of  Displaced Workers  
Relative to Expected Wage 
All Displaced Displacements Eligible for TAA 
This pattern of relative losses is may be due to severance payments being
made more often to workers eligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance than other
displaced workers. The same pattern is observed when the temporal pattern of
loss is estimated for workers displaced because of reasons related to business
conditions (including displacements caused by layoﬀ, bankruptcy, sold business
or poor business conditions). Since this group excludes firings it is more likely
that severance payments are received. This eﬀect is illustrated in Figure 3. The
smaller degree of loss is not explained by program benefits which are excluded
from the measure of earnings used here.
I also estimate equation 3 using an alternative outcome, unemployment. In
this alternative specification I regress an indicator for unemployment on the
period from displacement dummies as well as the interaction terms using fixed
eﬀects. The coeﬃcient estimates are reported in the third column of table 1.
Naturally, all displaced workers have a heightened likelihood of unemployment
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following displacement relative to non-displaced workers. This eﬀect diminishes
almost entirely by the sixth month following displacement. During the initial
three months following displacement, the likelihood of unemployment is greater
for workers eligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance. However, inference from
these estimates is diﬃcult. The Trade Adjustment Assistance program oﬀers
benefits that might aﬀect the propensity to regain employment (training pro-
grams, health benefits, etc.). The higher rate of unemployment for workers
eligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance may be due to the program treatment
rather than inherent diﬀerences in the ability to regain employment.
Next, I attempt to identify heterogenous eﬀects by educational attainment.
I reestimate equation 3 separately for workers from four diﬀerent categories of
educational attainment: less than high school, high school (or equivalent), some
college and college or beyond. The coeﬃcient estimates are reported in table 2.
The estimates indicate that among each educational class all workers face the
same pattern of earnings loss at the time of displacement followed by dimin-
ishing losses over the observable period. The greatest dollar losses are incurred
by college educated workers and the lower losses are incurred by those with
less than a high school education. The relative magnitudes reflect the average
earnings in each of these categories. In each of the education categories there
is little diﬀerence between the earnings loss faced by workers eligible for Trade
Adjustment Assistance and other displaced workers. One notable exception is
the case of workers with “some college” during the month of displacement. The
point estimate indicates that these workers face much smaller loses than other
displaced workers. This category includes workers with associates degrees as
well as certificates from vocational training programs. Also, workers eligible
for TAA with less than a high school education face losses that persist slightly
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Figure 2: The Effect of  Displacement on Likelihood of  Unemployment 
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Figure 3: Monthly Earnings Loss of  Displaced Workers  
Relative to Expected Wage 
Other Displacements Displacements Due to Business Conditions 
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7 Conclusion
In this paper I provided evidence that characterizes the experiences of dis-
placed workers eligible for benefits from the Trade Adjustment Assistance Pro-
gram. This information is necessary in order to determine whether these workers
fare worse than other displaced workers, justifying the existence of a program
like Trade Adjustment Assistance. I find some evidence that this group of
workers faces a diﬀerent experience following displacement than workers from
other industries. First, I find that they face smaller losses of earnings during the
month that they are displaced. This is likely due to severance payments or other
termination benefits that are sometimes provided during mass lay-oﬀ events. I
then observe that this group faces slightly more persistent earnings losses. In
the month following displacement these workers have a greater loss of earned
income than other displaced workers. These diﬀerences seem to diminish by the
second month following displacement, at which point the earnings losses faced
by each group are still significant, but not distinguishable from each other. I
also observe that this group of workers has a higher likelihood of unemployment
in the first three months following displacement. It is important to note the
limitations on inference from these estimates. Since non-displaced workers ap-
pear to be largely diﬀerent from displaced workers, on average, their wages do
not give a good indication of what the wages of displaced workers would have
been had they not been displaced. This means that the estimates of earnings
loss are likely biased upward. However, workers eligible for Trade Adjustment
Assistance do not diﬀer greatly from other displaced workers. Because of this,
the estimated diﬀerence between the earnings losses faced by these two groups
is not apparently biased.
These findings indicate that workers eligible for Trade Adjustment Assis-
tance do face experiences in unemployment that are diﬀerent from other work-
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ers. They face slightly longer periods of unemployment and have more persistent
earnings losses. However, these diﬀerences don’t necessarily justify the existence
of the Trade Adjustment Assistance program as it has been designed. These
eligible displaced workers do not seem to face unemployment spells that extend
far beyond those experienced by other displaced workers. Rather, they seem
to face slightly longer periods of frictional unemployment. Traditional unem-
ployment insurance oﬀers benefits that extend beyond the period in which the
rates of unemployment and earnings losses no longer diﬀer between eligible and
non-eligible workers. This reflects the fact that many displaced workers eligible
for Trade Adjustment Assistance benefits are able to either employ their human
capital eﬃciently in another industry or are able to regain employment in the
same industry, as was established in earlier literature. A more eﬃcient assis-
tance program might seek to support displaced workers who will have diﬃculty
regaining employment due to the nature of their skills. For instance, a worker
with industry specific human capital who is displaced due to technological inno-
vation may face more hardship following displacement than a worker with little




Dependent Variable: Monthly Earnings Monthly Earnings  Unemployed Indicator
Three months prior to displacement 12.1 9.588 -0.0114***
(19.00) (19.12) (0.00109)
Two months prior to displacement -63.95*** -64.87*** -0.0253***
(18.53) (18.62) (0.00106)
Once month priod to displacement -172.4*** -170.9*** -0.0580***
(18.11) (18.30) (0.00104)
Month of  displacement -750.3*** -757.0*** 0.961***
(17.82) (17.93) (0.00102)
One month after displacement -874.4*** -869.0*** 0.611***
(18.39) (18.53) (0.00106)
Two months after displacement -628.6*** -629.3*** 0.380***
(19.08) (19.21) (0.00109)
Three months after displacement -388.8*** -389.6*** 0.201***
(19.85) (20.09) (0.00115)
Four months after displacement -273.8*** -274.8*** 0.100***
(19.91) (20.02) (0.00114)
Five months after displacement -228.1*** -227.7*** 0.0627***
(20.02) (20.12) (0.00115)
Six month after displacement -177.3*** -182.0*** 0.0425***
(20.17) (20.24) (0.00115)
TAA Interaction
Three months prior to displacement 211.8 -0.0197*
(163.50) (0.00932)
Two months prior to displacement 74.57 0.0047
(177.70) (0.0101)
Once month prior to displacement -80.1 0.0156*
(123.40) (0.00703)
Month of  displacement 530.8*** 0.00856
(151.10) (0.00862)
One month after displacement -372.3* 0.135***
(145.60) (0.0083)
Two months after displacement 59.12 0.131***
(162.00) (0.00923)
Three months after displacement 39.47 0.0666***
(126.80) (0.00723)
Four months after displacement 93.93 -0.0394***
(183.20) (0.0104)
Five months after displacement -24.88 0.0202
(191.70) (0.0109
Six month after displacement 656.1** -0.0493***
(226.00) (0.0129)
N 988603 988603 988603
Controls: Education, Union Status, Age
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 1
The Effect of  Displacement 
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Dependent Variable: Monthly Earnings
Reason for Job Loss Less than HS High School Some College College
Three months prior to displacement -2.98 -12.52 -9.585 106.6
(20.02) (23.40) (28.85) (185.70)
Two months prior to displacement -48.66* -61.57** -52.25 -199.7
(19.45) (22.89) (28.02) (186.00)
Once month priod to displacement -106.3*** -198.5*** -162.3*** -391.5*
-19.15 -22.48 -27.49 -185.5
Month of  displacement -544.0*** -681.9*** -778.9*** -1933.0***
-18.49 -22.35 -26.87 -184.1
One month after displacement -502.0*** -762.8*** -905.2*** -2302.4***
-19.1 -23.03 -27.76 -192.4
Two months after displacement -336.3*** -555.8*** -616.0*** -2099.4***
-19.87 -23.97 -28.53 -199.7
Three months after displacement -158.1*** -357.8*** -419.5*** -986.2***
-20.7 -25.17 -29.84 -208.9
Four months after displacement -100.4*** -223.9*** -314.5*** -675.1**
-20.95 -24.9 -29.57 -208.4
Five months after displacement -86.44*** -170.9*** -256.0*** -634.6**
-21.1 -25.03 -29.61 -211.5
Six month after displacement -46.50* -165.1*** -187.7*** -749.2***
-21.35 -25.13 -29.71 -209.1
TAA Interaction
Three months prior to displacement -67.39 836.5*** 235.2 -225.1
-226.2 -228.1 -199.4 -2438.4
Two months prior to displacement -34.11 -30.63 117.1 -278.7
-197.7 -225.3 -268.3 -3201.4
Once month prior to displacement -315.7 -86.96 -37.61 -1014.9
-193.2 -148.9 -169.7 -1084.5
Month of  displacement 156.4 340.1 578.8** -926.6
-225.6 -178.7 -194.5 -2261.3
One month after displacement -152.9 -225.7 -45.84 429.3
-206.2 -216.6 -173.7 -1881.9
Two months after displacement -445.9* -55.03 56.69 1833.1
-218.2 -191 -228.2 -1888.8
Three months after displacement -16.57 -92.5 136.3 -852.2
-165.6 -162.9 -167.9 -1442.8
Four months after displacement 341.7 357.9 -83.98 -621.7
-217 -240.3 -231.8 -1617
Five months after displacement -116.5 123.4 93.95 -2028.3
-261 -252.3 -240.6 -1911.4
Six month after displacement 744 152.6 492.9 1870.9
-403.6 -271.8 -305 -3202.8
N 139679 289213 309981 79859
Controls: Education, Union Status, Age
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 2
The Effect of  Displacement by Education
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Employed All Displaced Displaced - TAA Eligible
Less than High School 0.22 0.29 0.11
(0.41) (0.45) (0.32)
High School 0.29 0.32 0.34
(0.45) (0.47) (0.48)
Some College 0.28 0.26 0.39
(0.45) (0.44) (0.49)
College 0.58 0.13 0.15
(0.49) (0.34) (0.36)
Time in Occupation (months) 122.46 68.85 70.28
(119.44) (92.73) (94.11)
Age 35.55 31.40 33.73
(22.42) (12.82) (12.79)
Standard deviation in parentheses.
Table 3
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